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INTRODUCTION 
Standard-form contracts offered to consumers contain numerous terms 
and clauses, most of which are ancillary to the main terms of the transac­
tion. We call these ancillary terms "boilerplate provisions." Since most 
consumers do not read boilerplate provisions or, if they do, find them hard 
to understand, 1 courts are suspicious of boilerplate provisions and some­
times find them unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability.2 At 
times, courts conclude that harsh terms have not been accepted by consum­
ers in the first place and therefore are not included in the contract,3 and on 
I. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 174, I I 77, 1 179 ( 1 983) ("Virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of adhe­
sion has accepted the truth [that the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard 
terms before signing the document] ... and the few empirical studies that have been done have 
agreed."). 
2. See u.c.c. § 2-302( 1 )  (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 ( 1 98 1 ); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 308 (Aspen Law & Bus. 3d ed. 1999). 
Courts could also declare harsh terms unenforceable when such terms are against public pol­
icy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-99, 2 1 1 cmt. c ( 198 1 ). Such tenns are also 
subject to the overriding obligation of good faith. Id. at §§ 21 1 cmt. c, 205. 
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 (3) cmts. b, c (noting instances where 
enforcement of terms is accepted by customers); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4.26, at 
298-300. For the various legal tools used to handle harsh tenns in standard-form contracts, includ­
ing the "reasonable expectation" doctrine, see Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard­
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 456--60 (2002). 
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other occasions courts interpret boilerplate provisions in favor of consumers, 
applying the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.4 
There is ample legal writing discussing the justification for legislatures' 
and courts' intervention in consumer standard-form contracts.5 Most law and 
economics scholars agree that striking down harsh clauses included in 
boilerplate language could be justified when there is asymmetry of informa­
tion--either factual or legal-between the supplier and consumers with 
respect to the harsh clause, which precludes consumers from fully under­
standing the effects of the clause on their legal rights.6 In such cases, there is 
a risk that the supplier will extract payment from the consumer without the 
latter being aware of the fact that the payment does not reflect the reduction 
of value due to the harsh clause.7 Thus, if an exclusionary boilerplate clause 
phrased in a sophisticated legal manner releases the supplier from liability 
for late delivery of goods, the consumer might not realize the full effects of 
such a clause or understand the very high price she might pay for it in the 
future.8 If this risk is a substantial one, a court could be justified in striking 
down the clause. If, however, most consumers could reasonably understand 
the exclusionary clause and estimate its costs for them, a court's interven­
tion would not be justified, since absent asymmetry of information there is 
no reason to suspect that incorporating the clause into the contract would be 
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981 ); see also FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 2, § 4.26, at 300. 
5. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REv. 2 1 1 ,  240--41 (1995) (stating that for the past forty years, contract scholars have been 
preoccupied with enforceability of preprinted contract terms); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rational­
ity, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 203 (2003) [hereinafter 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality] (arguing that the drafting parties will have a market incentive to 
include terms in their standard forms that favor themselves, whether or not such terms are efficient); 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 673-
75 (1998) (suggesting that courts use nonenforcement default rules to force parties to fill contractual 
gaps); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doc­
trine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 
284 (1995) ("[T]he efficiency argument concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary contracts 
that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of their distributive consequences."); Rakoff, 
supra note 1 ,  at 1 238. 
6. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1 226 ("[T]he rational course is to focus on the few terms that are 
generally well publicized and of immediate concern, and to ignore the rest."). But see Douglas G. 
Baird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con, 98 MICH. L. REV. 27 1 6, 2724 (2000) 
("General rules governing the use of preprinted terms do little with respect to places where abuse is 
likely and too much where it is not."). 
7. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 770 (1993) ("[T]he efficiency of consumer product 
markets depends upon consumers' ability to overcome information costs, for without full informa­
tion consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true 
preferences."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1990) ("[I]mperfect consumer information causes a 
tendency toward inefficiency in transactions involving consumer form contracts."). 
8. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1217-18  ("Efficiency requires not only 
that buyers be aware of the content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate that infor­
mation into their purchase decisions. Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully 
rational decisionmakers, they will infrequently satisfy this requirement."). 
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inefficient.9 On the contrary, when information is symmetric, both parties 
strive to incorporate efficient terms into their contract, terms that increase 
the surplus of the contract to the benefit of both parties. 
In this Article, we argue that boilerplate provisions and standard-form 
contracts are used--or could be used-by suppliers for purposes other than 
the familiar one discussed above. Some of these uses are efficient and some 
are inefficient. What all these uses have in common is that their virtue to the 
supplier lies in the transaction costs imposed upon consumers, from which 
the supplier expects to gain. '0 However, in contrast to the familiar use of 
boilerplate provisions as creating asymmetry of information between the 
supplier and consumers, we discuss cases in which the asymmetry of infor­
mation is not necessarily between the supplier and consumers, but rather 
between different kinds of consumers or between consumers and noncon­
sumers. We also discuss cases in which the supplier could gain from the 
transaction costs imposed on consumers even absent any kind of informa­
tion asymmetries, as well as cases in which the transaction costs imposed by 
the supplier could be beneficial from a welfare perspective. 
In the following paragraphs we summarize the four main categories of 
cases that are the focus of this Article, characterized by the different goals 
suppliers might try to achieve by imposing transaction costs on consumers. 
In the first category of cases, the supplier uses boilerplate provisions and 
other contractual terms for segmentation of consumers. By creating transac­
tion costs that some consumers are willing to bear while others are not, 
suppliers could achieve several goals. First, suppliers may want to transact 
with certain consumers but not with others. At times a supplier could use 
boilerplate provisions to screen out the unwanted consumers by imposing 
high transaction costs upon them, while at the same time keeping transac­
tion costs low enough for other consumers. On other occasions, the supplier 
could use boilerplate terms to impose the same transaction costs on all con­
sumers, expecting only the consumers he would like to transact with to incur 
these costs. Second, the supplier could use boilerplate provisions for price 
discrimination by conferring benefits only on consumers who read, under­
stand, and remember certain boilerplate provisions. Third, the supplier may 
want to use boilerplate provisions to hide benefits conferred upon one group 
of consumers from the eyes of another group that did not receive these bene­
fits. Fourth, boilerplate provisions could be a useful and reliable tool for 
suppliers for receiving information about consumers' preferences. Suppliers 
9. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Con­
sumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 263, 1299 (1993) (concluding that buyers should be 
bound only to those form terms that they "know and comprehend"). 
This is true regardless of the supplier's market power, since even a monopoly has no reason to 
include a harsh clause that reduces the supplier and the consumer's joint payoffs. See Richard 
Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relation­
ships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 ,  369 ( 1 991); Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1 2 1 1 -1 2. 
10. The phrase "transaction costs" is used in this Article in the broader sense, to encompass 
not only information barriers, but also cognitive limitations. We recognize that in other contexts it 
makes sense to distinguish between the two, as demonstrated by Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
supra note 5. 
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could do so by monitoring the way in which consumers explore boilerplate 
language, given the transaction costs they need to incur in order to conduct 
such exploration. 
In the second category of cases, the supplier uses boilerplate provisions 
for stabilization of cartels and obstruction of competition among suppliers. 
First, suppliers could use boilerplate language to make their contracts com­
plex so that consumers would find it difficult to compare contracts of 
competing suppliers. Such complexity deters suppliers from deviating from 
explicit or tacit cartels, since consumers would have difficulty in compre­
hending that the price-cutting supplier is offering them a better deal. 
Complexity also tends to raise prices in oligopolistic markets even absent 
tacit or explicit cartels. Moreover, complexity could deter entry of new firms 
into the suppliers' market. Second, suppliers could use beneficial boilerplate 
provisions, available only to consumers who read, understand, and remem­
ber them, in order to facilitate the sustainability of tacit or explicit cartels. 
While collusion over harsh boilerplate provisions could relatively easily 
break down, collusion over the terms applied to nonreaders of boilerplate 
provisions, coupled with benefits granted to readers of these provisions, 
could be more sustainable, and at times, also more profitable. Third, suppli­
ers could use beneficial boilerplate provisions, available only to readers of 
such terms who understand and remember them, as an anticompetitive sig­
naling device. The beneficial provisions are a relatively credible and cheap 
signal of how efficient and competent the supplier is. Such a signal could 
discourage welfare-enhancing (unsuccessful) attempts by rivals to exclude 
the supplier and could also deter entry of new suppliers. 
In the third category of cases the supplier tries to create a facade of a 
contract that is different than its true nature. Sometimes the supplier creates 
a facade of a fair contract by balancing harsh terms in the contract with 
beneficial terms hidden in boilerplate provisions. This facade can help im­
munize the contract from intervention by courts or administrative bodies or 
from public criticism. The supplier lowers his costs of granting the counter­
vailing benefits by creating transaction costs that preclude many consumers 
from benefiting from these terms. Additionally, in some cases the supplier is 
concerned about criticism coming from nonparties for conferring far­
reaching benefits to parties to the contract. By raising the transaction costs 
of nonparties and making it hard for them to understand the nature of the 
contract, the supplier may escape their criticism and related consequences. 
In the fourth and last category of cases, standard-form contracts are used 
by the supplier to create self-inflicted transaction costs that credibly signal 
that the contract, or some of its terms, are not negotiable. This credible sig­
nal serves the supplier's interests in various contexts. In some contexts, the 
value of a beneficial term in the contract is contingent upon its non­
negotiability. Sometimes the supplier may want to signal to each of his 
commercial buyers that the terms of sale granted to his other commercial 
buyers are not negotiable. This could help the supplier commit to not grant­
ing concessions to any of his buyers. Also, suppliers who participate in an 
implicit or explicit cartel may want to induce their rivals to participate as 
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well by making their own defections from the cartel more transparent. They 
can do so by adopting standard contracts and increasing their own transac­
tion costs of secretly negotiating them with selected customers. 
The various uses of boilerplate language and standard-form contracts to 
generate transaction costs raise the question of whether these uses are desir­
able from a social perspective. Some of the uses are desirable, while some 
are either undesirable altogether or undesirable under certain circumstances. 
While a comprehensive exploration of all of the policy implications of all of 
the above-mentioned uses of boilerplate and standard-form contracts is be­
yond the scope of this Article, we focus in detail on the policy implications 
of beneficial boilerplate provisions. In doing so we also discuss certain doc­
trines and principles taken from antitrust law, consumer law, contracts, and 
torts, and demonstrate how these doctrines and rules could be applied to 
cope with the harsh effects that beneficial boilerplate terms could cause. 
This Article is organized as follows: in Parts I through IV we discuss in 
detail the various uses of boilerplate provisions and standard-form contracts, 
as represented by the four categories of cases summarized above. In Part V 
we evaluate beneficial boilerplate terms from a normative point of view, and 
discuss the attitude the law should take toward them. 
I. SEGMENTATION OF CONSUMERS 
A. Screening Consumers Out 
Sometimes the supplier is not interested in transacting with all consum­
ers but only with some consumer segments. She could use boilerplate 
language to screen out unwanted consumers by inflicting high transaction 
costs upon them, thereby making the transaction prohibitively costly for 
them. The supplier's desire to transact only with some consumers but not 
with others could stem from their different qualities, different abilities of 
performance, or any other characteristic that could affect the supplier's ex­
pected profits. As we will immediately see through the first hypothetical 
example, not all such uses of boilerplate provisions should be permitted by 
law. 
Example 1. Language. Supplier offers apartments for rent in an urban 
place in Israel where most residents are Jewish. Supplier prefers not to 
transact with Arabs partly because his employees do not speak Arabic, but 
mainly because he believes that if he could keep the residency homoge­
nous and Jewish, he would reap more profits from renting the apartments. 
This is because many Jewish people are reluctant to live in the same 
neighborhood as Arabs. Supplier offers his potential consumers a standard­
form contract drafted in Hebrew, which most potential Arab consumers 
find hard to read and understand. 11 
1 1 . Similarly, English-speaking vendors and suppliers contract with non-English small­
business owners primarily through the medium of English-language standardized forms. Julian S. 
Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of Contract Law to Racial-Language 
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Drafting the contract in Hebrew and conducting all negotiations in He­
brew, raises the transaction costs of people who do not read the language. 
The reason for using language as a screening device could be the supplier's 
racism or his assumption that the consumers he wants to attract are racists. 
Instead of explicitly refusing to transact with Arabs, which is prohibited by 
law and could damage the supplier's reputation, the supplier may find it less 
costly to discriminate implicitly by drafting and negotiating all contracts in 
Hebrew. Moreover, if criticized, the supplier could always argue that draft­
ing and negotiating in Arabic requires him to hire Arabic-speaking 
employees or translators, resulting in high costs that are not economically 
justified, given the few potential Arab consumers. 
The next example illustrates cases where the supplier wishes to particu­
larly attract customers who make repeat transactions or large purchases. The 
reason could be, for example, that the supplier bears more transaction costs 
when he has to deal with many new customers, and he could economize on 
his transaction costs when he deals with experienced repeat purchasers. 
More generally, with large purchasers, the supplier does not have to recruit a 
multitude of customers in order to reach an efficient scale of operation and 
recoup his fixed costs. 
Example 2. Repeat Consumers. Supplier offers sophisticated technical 
equipment for rent for short periods of time. Supplier prefers to serve only 
repeat consumers. Practically, he cannot charge the one-time consumers 
higher prices, either because the law prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of the quantity purchased, 12 or because it is hard to distinguish between the 
one-time consumers and the repeat consumers. Supplier could screen out 
the one-time consumers by making the initial transaction costs of renting 
equipment for the first time high enough that the transaction is worthwhile 
only for repeat consumers. The supplier can achieve this goal by compli­
cating the boilerplate language of the standard-form contract and by 
complicating the contracting stage as a whole.13 
Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 586-90 (2003); see also Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection 
for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
1027, 1036 (1996) ("Although most merchants will not affirmatively misrepresent their deals to the 
Spanish-Only Consumer, many merchants will transact business with them partially or entirely in 
English."). 
12. According to Section l (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000), "[i]t 
shall be unlawful . . .  to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like 
grade and quality .. . where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition with any person who .. . knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 
This section has been interpreted to prohibit quantity discounts granted to large commercial buy­
ers--discounts which small commercial buyers cannot enjoy due to their limited demand-unless 
they are justified by different costs involved in selling different quantities. See Fed. Trade Comm'n 
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
13. Illustrative are the registration forms of Internet web sites offering services free of 
charge. In order to become a member of such web site, the user must fill out various registration 
forms. As part of the registration process, the web site sends authentication messages to the user's 
email address and the user has to confirm their receipt to activate his membership. One of the rea­
sons for such requirements could be the imposition of additional transaction costs in order to screen 
out one-time users. See, e.g., DriverGuide, Join for Free, http://members.driverguide.com/ums/ 
index.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
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In Example 2, the boilerplate language, standard-form contracts, and 
paperwork create artificial barriers for consumers entering into the contract. 
Only consumers who expect to gain high enough profits will incur the trans­
action costs, and typically those will be the repeat consumers. Note that if a 
one-time consumer enters into the contract after all, we assume the supplier 
would not be able to extract a higher price from him. If he could do so, it 
would be a case of quantity discounts. 
The creation of high transaction costs in order to screen out one-time 
consumers is a very common phenomenon. Thus, consumer membership 
clubs linked to the supplier's store or chain of stores are beneficial to the 
supplier only when repeat consumers are concerned, since the administrative 
costs of adding a member to the club could be higher than the expected 
profits the supplier could make on a one-time consumer. Increasing the con­
sumers' transaction costs in joining the club by asking them to read and fill 
out long and time-consuming documents and forms could be a practical way 
to screen out one-time consumers.14 
Screening out small commercial buyers could also be desirable to some 
suppliers. Suppliers can do so by imposing transaction costs that are high 
enough to deter small buyers from entering the contract. If a small grocery 
store, for example, needs to fill out complex forms and questionnaires each 
month in order to buy from the supplier, it may switch to a different supplier 
who does not impose such transaction costs. A large- or medium-sized su­
permarket chain, on the other hand, may find such transaction costs 
negligible compared to the volume of their business with the supplier. 
One may ask why suppliers often screen out one-time or small custom­
ers by imposing transaction costs rather than by using a subscription fee or 
other fixed payment that would be prohibitive for one-time or small custom­
ers but worthwhile for repeat or large purchasers. After all, while transaction 
costs constitute a net loss to both sides of the contract, a subscription fee 
increases the supplier's revenue. One reason could be that with subscription 
fees, customers may suspect that the supplier is using the subscription fee to 
make additional profits at their expense and may therefore prefer a compet-
1 4. Another example is found in a new service offered by Visa in Israel. The credit card 
company issues credit cards to minors (called Y cards), and limits the credit to a few hundred shek­
els that the minor's parent transfers in advance to the minor's credit account. See Y card, 
http://www.ycard.co.il (Israeli web site). In order to issue the card, the minor (and his parent) need 
to fill out long forms and also bring them in person to the bank. We speculate that if the transaction 
costs had been very low, many minors would have applied for the credit card without considering 
seriously enough whether they really intend to use it. By raising transaction costs, Visa ensures that 
applicants, before applying for the card, will give it a second thought. This way, the credit card 
issuer saves its costs of issuing a card to minors who do not really intend to use it. 
Another example is the members club "The University Book Store," which offers house 
charge accounts to those who find it easier and who qualify," and promises its members "no 
annual fee; Low credit card interest on your revolving credit balance; Special promotions avail­
able only to University Book Store credit card holders." In order to become a member, the 
customer has to fill in a time-consuming enrollment form, print it out, and send it by post­
mail. See University Book Store, Customer Service, http://www.bookstore.washington.edu/ 
services.taf?dept=about&category=services&par=services&ttl=services. A similar practice is used 
by "frequent buyers" clubs. See, e.g., Duty Free Stores New Zealand, http://www.dutyfreestores.co.nzJ 
Frequent%20Buyer%20Club Oast visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
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ing supplier, who screens out one-time customers via transaction costs 
rather than via subscription fees.15 Another reason is that the supplier would 
often like to make the subscription fee smaller for large customers than for 
small customers, in order to be attractive to large customers. 16 For practical 
reasons, however, it would be hard for the supplier to charge different sub­
scription fees to different consumers. When using transaction costs, the 
supplier could often achieve such discrimination in favor of large customers 
since large customers often find the transaction costs less burdensome than 
small customers do. For example, a large supermarket chain could assign 
one of its various employees the task of specializing in the paperwork re­
quired by various suppliers. The owner of a small grocery store, on the other 
hand, would have to spend his own valuable time on going through such 
paperwork. 
Another method for screening out small or one-time customers is 
through quantity discounts. Recall, however, that these depend on the sup­
plier being able to distinguish between small and large buyers. Furthermore, 
when small and large commercial buyers compete with each other, quantity 
discounts are generally prohibited.17 
In other cases, the supplier is concerned about "risky" consumers, who 
would not fulfill their part of the deal or would otherwise burden the sup­
plier. Ideally, the supplier could charge them higher prices or collect 
damages from them when they fail to perform their part of the contract. 
Practically, however, requiring consumers to pass the test of high transaction 
costs could often be a better choice. This practical solution would be more 
attractive than the other alternatives when consumers' defaults are unobserv­
able or unverifiable, when the expected damages from the defaults are too 
low to justify litigation, or when it is impractical to charge more risky con­
sumers higher prices, for example, because it is impossible to identify them 
in advance as risky. Examples of such cases are short-term employment con­
tracts and short-term rental contracts.18 In both types of cases, it is hard for 
the supplier to predict which employees or consumers are risky, in the sense 
that they might change their minds and defect, either before performance 
1 5. One could claim that a subscription fee does not necessarily deter consumers because it 
allows the supplier to charge lower prices per unit. This claim does not always hold, however. For 
behavioural reasons, and also due to Jack of sufficient information, consumers cannot accurately 
calculate the value of their time in bearing the transaction costs imposed by the supplier. They are 
aware, however, of the fact that a subscription fee can be used by the supplier to extract surplus from 
them and transaction costs cannot. Accordingly, they may prefer a supplier who screens out using 
transaction costs to a supplier who screens out using a subscription fee and charges the same price 
per unit as the first supplier. See Darren Duxbury et al., Mental Accounting and Decision Making: 
Evidence Under Reverse Conditions Where Money is Spent for Time Saved, 26 J. EcoN. PSYCH. 567 
(2005) (stating that individuals irrationally tend to value money more than they value time). 
1 6. Large customers enjoy the benefits of such discrimination not only directly, but also 
indirectly, since the quality of the supplier's services could be enhanced when small customers are 
excluded. 
1 7. See supra note 12.  
1 8. For example, see the sophisticated application form and the rules and regulations that 
must be followed in order to enroll in Educational Housing Services in New York. See Educational 
Housing Services, http://www.studenthousing.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
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starts or a short while thereafter, leaving the supplier with unrecoverable 
losses. The following example is illustrative of such cases: 
Example 3. Short-term Employment. Supplier is a fast-food chain that hires 
unprofessional manpower for various tasks. Supplier realizes that very of­
ten employees quit a few days following commencement of employment, 
after the supplier has invested efforts in training them for the job. For prac­
tical reasons, the supplier can neither charge them for its costs when they 
quit, nor charge them in advance when hired. 19 
As we have explained, conditioning employment upon incurring high 
transaction costs could be a practical technique for screening out employees 
who are not certain whether they want the job or not. Asking potential em­
ployees to fill out long forms and requiring them to sign detailed contracts 
that require costly legal consulting could serve as a guarantee that the poten­
tial employee is serious enough about the job. Notice that while it is 
relatively easy to verify the employees' competence for the job, it is much 
harder to verify their willingness to persist in the job for a long period of 
time.20 
We conclude this section with a (wild?) speculation about the submis­
sion process conducted by top U.S. Law Reviews. We have noticed that 
most top law reviews in the United States condition submission of a paper 
upon mailing a hard copy to the law review in addition to an electronic ver­
sion that should follow.21 The hard-copy requirement could create 
transaction costs that would screen out writers that may be thought of as less 
likely to succeed in their submission. Such screening out would save the law 
reviews costs and time. W riters for whom the hard copy requirement creates 
19. See, for example, job search sites on the Internet, Monster, http://www.monster.com (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2006), and Career Builder, http://www.careerbuilder.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
Both sites offer information about jobs free of charge and allow for online applications to various 
firms, but require applicants to fill out long forms that differ from each other for each and every 
workplace. Also, the complicated process of filling out the application forms required for receiving 
a visa to enter the United States is an example of raising transaction costs in order to screen out 
applicants who are not sure whether they indeed want to enter the United States. See U.S Immigra­
tion Support, http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). 
20. An interesting example of screening out consumers who are not serious enough is the 
process students must go through in order to be admitted to top universities. Top U.S. law schools 
require that students invest a lot of effort in submitting their applications, including an essay re­
quirement, detailed forms, and much more. It is true that some of these requirements are truly 
needed for evaluating the candidates as potential students. We suspect, however, that occasionally 
some of the requirements are not necessary, except for the purpose of assuring that the candidate 
"means business" and is less likely to withdraw his candidacy at a later stage. An alternative way to 
assure the candidate's seriousness would be to charge him a fine if he withdraws, or to require a 
deposit to ensure the admission, but sometimes this solution is impractical, especially when the 
harm from late withdrawal is relatively high. Moreover, it would be difficult and costly to distin­
guish cases of financial hardship, in which such fines may be inappropriate. 
2 1 .  This information can be verified from the list of law reviews that appears at ExpressO's 
website. ExpressO is a service provided by Bepress for multiple submissions of papers to U.S. law 
reviews. See ExpressO, http:tnaw.bepress.com/expresso/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). To be sure, it 
could be that the appearance of ExpressO reduced the transaction costs involved in multiple submis­
sions and also reduced the difference between the transaction costs born by foreign and domestic 
authors. 
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relatively high transaction costs are non-U .S. writers who bear higher mail­
ing costs than their U.S. colleagues and other writers who bear mailing and 
other administrative costs themselves, costs which full-time professors usu­
ally shift to their universities. Notice that the multiple-submission system 
encourages concurrently submitting a paper to fifty or more law reviews, 
entailing very high administrative costs. Those who frequently submit to law 
reviews must be either writers who are very optimistic about the likelihood 
that their papers will be published, or writers who are able to shift all, or 
most, of the costs to others. The latter group consists mainly of U.S. (and 
some European and other) professors. If belonging to these two groups is a 
good proxy for the quality of the writer and the paper, the hard-copy re­
quirement could be considered by some as appropriate. But is it a good 
proxy? Admittedly, there could be other explanations for the hard-copy re­
quirement, such as the possibility that the law review is attempting to shift 
the costs of printing the documents to the author, due to the law review's 
budget constraints, coupled with the need to review hard, rather than elec­
tronic, copies. Nevertheless, even where the motivation for the practice is 
not one of screening out, the screening out effect mentioned above may re­
main intact. 
Note that using transaction costs and standard-form contracts to screen 
out unwanted consumers could be sustainable even when the supplier faces 
intense competition from other suppliers. First, in some cases, such as the 
ethnic-discrimination examples, consumers the supplier wishes to retain do 
not bear considerable transaction costs, and therefore competing suppliers 
could not steal such consumers on account of such transaction costs. Sec­
ond, even in cases in which consumers the supplier wishes to retain do bear 
some transaction costs, they usually enjoy the fact that other consumers are 
excluded. Accordingly, they may well prefer the supplier to competing sup­
pliers who do not screen out unwanted consumers via transaction costs. 
B. Price Discrimination 
Uniform goods and services are normally sold to consumers at uniform 
prices. A specific consumer's willingness to pay does not affect the price he 
pays. For obvious reasons, the supplier of uniform goods and services may 
find it beneficial to discriminate in prices in order to extract more surplus 
from consumers. However, price discrimination relating to uniform goods is 
sometimes prohibited by law. Even when price discrimination is permitted, 
the supplier could find it hard to implement. One main reason is that on 
many occasions a consumer's willingness to pay is unobservable to the sup­
plier or the costs of verifying it are very high. Therefore, suppliers try to use 
proxies for consumers' willingness to pay. To illustrate, airlines charge con­
sumers higher prices for short stays in the passenger's destination than for 
long stays. A possible explanation is that most short-journey travelers are 
businesspeople, while most long-journey travelers are people traveling on 
vacation, and on average, the former group, or their employers, are willing 
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to pay higher prices than the latter group.22 Another common example is the 
use of coupons. Only consumers who collect coupons and bring them to the 
store will get a discount, while others will pay the regular price. On average, 
people who spend time collecting coupons are less willing to pay than peo­
ple who do not do it, and only the former group will get lower prices. 23 
We claim here that a useful way to price discriminate is through boiler­
plate provisions and the imposition of transaction costs via standard-form 
contracts. 
1 .  Beneficial Terms 
Example 4. Special Discount. Supplier who sells TV sets offers, in a boi­
lerplate provision, a special discount to consumers who fill out a certain 
form and mail it back to the supplier. Only consumers who read the boiler­
plate carefully and remember to fill out the form and mail it enjoy the 
special discount. 
Many consumers would not pay too much attention to the special dis­
count since they are willing to buy the product for its posted price. Such 
consumers do not explore the boilerplate provisions in order to find benefits 
such as the special discount. On the other hand, consumers who are not will­
ing to pay the posted price are more likely to read the boilerplate provisions 
to look for benefits such as a special discount. 
Example 4 represents cases where certain boilerplate provisions are 
beneficial only to consumers who are ready to incur the transaction costs the 
supplier imposed upon them, and typically those consumers are the ones 
less willing to pay. In Example 4, the transaction costs are the costs of read­
ing, understanding, and remembering the special discount hidden in the 
boilerplate. The supplier hides the beneficial term in the boilerplate because 
he wants to benefit only consumers who would not have bought the goods at 
the posted price absent the beneficial term. If the beneficial terms had been 
more salient, many consumers, whose decision to enter the contract was not 
contingent upon receiving the benefits, would have also received them, and 
the supplier's overall profits would have been diminished. 
There are many examples of cases in which consumers who are ready to 
incur the transaction costs receive an immediate price reduction. Thus, Ba­
rak, an international call carrier in Israel, offers special rates to consumers 
who call the carrier and sign up, while if they use the carrier without signing 
22. Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Kenneth M. Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the 
Digital Divide, 20 CAROOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 66 (2002); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1216 
(2001 ). 
23. See, e.g. , Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, A Theory of Channel Price Promotions, 81 
AM. EcoN. REv. 872 (1991) (examining rebates as a possible tool for price discrimination); Hal R. 
Varian, A Model of Sales, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 651 ( 1980) (forming one of the pioneering economic 
models showing that suppliers can price discriminate between informed and uninformed buyers). 
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up they would pay rates approximately three times higher!24 We suspect that 
the carrier tries to understate these benefits, hiding them from consumers 
who use the carrier's services anyway, without signing up. Consequently, 
there are many consumers who use the carrier's services for many years, not 
being aware of the very special rates they can get by making one short 25 phone call. These consumers are probably the ones who care less about 
their money or care more about their time (or are just careless?), and there­
fore are more willing to pay. Alternatively, they may be one-time consumers 
who find it prohibitively costly to invest in transaction costs when they have 
very little at stake. 
An analogous example is hiding a best-price guarantee in the boiler­
plate.26 In this example, the supplier undertakes in the boilerplate provision 
to match any competing offer given by another supplier. Another example is 
the case of selling goods with an option to return them and get a refund if 
24. The carrier describes the discounted rates on its Internet site as its regular rates. Within a 
list of boilerplate conditions it mentions that these rates apply only to those who signed up. For 
details in Hebrew, see 013 Barak, Le�oat:i Prati-Ta'arifei Sil:lot [Private Subscriber-Calling 
Rates], http://www.Ol3.net/heb/ (follow "Ta'arifon Sil:lot" link) (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
25. This example is based on personal experience. A similar example concerns using toll 
roads. We found out that a driver can receive a twenty percent discount for using a toll road in Israel 
if the driver, before using the road, calls a specific number in advance and signs up. When the driver 
calls and signs up, he has to fill out a form promising to pay via credit card and to agree that his 
license-plates will be videotaped. A discount of forty percent is available for drivers who call and 
agree to install an on-board unit on their cars. At first blush, such a procedure could lower the col­
lection costs of the firm managing the toll road and explain the benefit. However, since the fines for 
delayed payments are extremely high, the firm does not have a strong economic incentive to encour­
age clients to sign up. For details in Hebrew, see Derech Eretz Highways Mgmt Corp. Ltd, Kvish 6 
[Highway 6] (2002), http://www.kvish6.co.il/ (follow "Hitstarfut Kemanui [Joining as a Member]" 
link). A similar example can be found in ECG, a U.S. long-distance call carrier, which 
offers a significant discount for interstate calls to clients who fill out a long enrollment form. See 
Enhanced Communication Group, ECG Secure Order, https://myecgaccount.com/order/?sid= 
KZzk2uoxb2js5gAZTm 1 U8MG07hBPiHaz&page=qualify (last visited Nov. 30, 2005). 
26. Circuit City, an electronics retailer, makes the following guarantee in its "Terms of Use," 
found by following a link appearing in the fine print at the bottom of the site: "If you've seen a 
lower advenised price from a local store with the same item in stock, we want to know about it. 
Bring it to our attention, and we'll gladly beat their price by 10% of the difference. Even after your 
Circuit City purchase, if you see a lower advenised price (including our own sale prices) within 30 
days, we'll refund 110% of the difference." Circuit City, Imponant Legal Information (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.circuitcity.com/ccd/lookLeam.do?cat=-133 l 7 &edOid=l 05469&c=l . Before the Good 
Guys, another electronics retailer, were subsumed by Circuit City, they also guaranteed prices: "If 
you find a lower verifiable delivered price (before tax) from bestbuy.com, circuitcity.com, or Crutch­
field.com, on an available product of the same brand and model, we'll gladly match that price . . . .  
Or, if within 30 days . . .  of your purchase from goodguys.com, you find a lower verifiable delivered 
price from bestbuy.com, circuitcity.com, or crutchfield.com, on an available product of the same 
brand and model, we'll refund the difference." T he Good Guys, Low Price Guarantee, at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20041009231528/http:l/thegoodguys.com/help.asp (archived Oct. 9, 
2004). For a discussion of the competitive effects of low-price guarantees, see Aaron S. Edlin, Do 
Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997). Edlin also points out that low-price guarantees enable price dis­
crimination between customers who are aware of the guarantee and are willing to cite a competing 
price and other consumers. Our additional insight is that suppliers may want to "hide" their Iow­
price guarantees in boilerplate language, rather than making them salient, so that only the panicu­
larly price-sensitive consumers would use the guarantees. 
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later the consumer changes his mind for any reason.27 In recent years some 
stores have offered consumers, in their boilerplate terms, the option to return 
a good even after a few years and get a discounted refund.28 Probably many 
consumers are not aware of these options, or do not care much about their 
existence. Others do care, and sometimes use the option to their benefit. 
Hiding such benefits from consumers who do not incur the transaction costs 
(of reading, understanding, and remembering the beneficial term) is a com­
mon strategy used by many suppliers, and results in price discrimination.29 A 
similar practice is common in subscription sales. For example, Internet ser­
vice providers often have a boilerplate provision granting customers signing 
up an option to cancel within a certain period of time and get their money 
back.30 Many customers are not aware of this option, hidden in the boiler­
plate provision, and therefore do not use it. Probably those who are more 
hesitant about signing up would tend to incur the transaction costs and ex­
plore all the terms of the contract offered to them. They will be the ones 
taking advantage of the benefit. 
The discussion thus far implies that at least three types of consumers 
will incur the transaction costs of reading, understanding, and remembering 
27. Even though such a practice is very common in the United States and many suppliers 
will refund the returned goods even without an explicit undertaking, in other countries, absent such 
a term, the price for the goods will not be refunded. An example of such a term can be found in the 
boilerplate of BigNet, an Israeli  company that sells internet domains. BigNet offers a full refund 
within thirty days to unsatisfied customers. BigNet, l:favilot Il:isun [Storage Packages] ( 1 999), 
http://bignet.co.il/articles/show Article.asp?menu_id=60. A similar provision can be found in the 
terms of sale of an Israeli electronics retailer, E-Net, which promises a full refund for some of its 
products returned within fourteen days for any reason. See E-Net, Ma'arekhet Yeshivah Me'or Amiti 
Dgam CHERRY [Authentic Leather Seating Set, Cherry Model], http://www.e-net.co.il/ 
product.asp?productid=4966&CatCode= (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). The same provision is offered by 
Sakal, another electronics retailer. Sakal, Salon 'Or Niftal:i Me'or Napah Garox 3+2 [Garox 
3+2 Napa Leather Partially Reclining Living Room Set], http://www.sakal.co.il/jsp/pg/ 
Product.jsp?comp=l&sec=2&prod=69535&saleNo=l 009431 (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). 
28. This observation is based on the personal experiences of one of the authors regarding 
several stores in Chicago. Unfortunately, he does not recall the identity of the store or the products 
purchased under these conditions, which proves our point! 
29. Some analogous examples: Data Vision, an electronics retailer, suggests in its Terms of 
Sale that you, as a customer, can "contact your datavis.com account manager for our most current 
and competitive rates, options and shipping specials." Data Vision, Terms and Conditions of 
Sale (2001), https://www.datavis.com/webapp/commerce/command/ExecMacro/Datavision/macros/ 
statics/termsofsale.d2w/report. Similarly, Novell suggests that customers interested in additional 
support visit the relevant site: "For more information on Novell's current support offerings, see 
Novell, http://support.novell.com." Novell, Novell Software License Agreement, http:// 
forge.novell.com/modules/xfcontent/file.php/nvds/DEPENDENCIES.html (last visited Jan. 1 0, 
2006). MPC, another electronics retailer, offers credit in its boilerplate for the return of replaced 
parts: "MPC will issue a credit to you for the return of parts being replaced from the new Product 
being upgraded or downgraded. Your request for a credit must be made (and a Returned Merchan­
dise Authorization [RMA] number issued) within the time periods set forth ... . " MPC, Terms and 
Conditions of Sale (Aug. 30, 2004), http://www.rnpccorp.com/about/legal/terms_and_conditions_ 
of_sale.html. 
30. See, for example, the boilerplate terms of sale of Speakeasy, which offers broadband 
Internet services: "Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services ... . If you feel that 
you must cancel within 25 calendar days of your Activation Date you may do so without being 
subject to a Disconnection Fee." Speakeasy, Terms of Service (Sept. 28, 2005), 
http://www.speakeasy.net/tos/. 
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the beneficial boilerplate terms. These are the consumers who care more 
about their money, care less about their time, or have more to gain from in­
curring the transaction costs. As noted, these are also the consumers who are 
typically induced to purchase the product on account of the beneficial boi­
lerplate provision, while other consumers would buy the product regardless 
of the beneficial provision. Of course, this proxy of consumers' willingness 
to pay is an imperfect one.31 In particular, some customers who do not incur 
the transaction costs would not be willing to pay the posted price absent the 
benefits. Conversely, some customers who incur the transaction costs would 
buy the product even absent the benefits but nevertheless incur them because 
they gain more than others from doing so or are more sophisticated and 
well-informed consumers. 
Conferring benefits only upon those who know how to appreciate them 
is the mirror image of the familiar use of harsh boilerplate terms set by the 
supplier in order to extract surplus from consumers without them being 
aware of it. In both cases, the supplier incorporates a boilerplate term or 
terms, hoping that many consumers will not be able to estimate the negative 
or positive effect on their rights. In the beneficial-terms case, however, it 
seems that those who do not appreciate the beneficial terms and therefore do 
not receive them, cannot argue that their expectations were frustrated: they 
got exactly what they expected to get. This is in contrast to the familiar use 
of harsh boilerplate terms, where the main concern is that the consumer ex­
pected a different contract than the one she actually got. Later we discuss 
the legal implications of the similarities and differences between these two 
32 cases. 
2. Complexity 
Example 5 illustrates how price discrimination through boilerplate pro-
visions could also discriminate in favor of sophisticated consumers. 
Example 5. Cellular Packages.33 A cellular firm offers a menu of packages: 
each package differs from the others with regard to rate per minute, 
monthly fee, night rate, rates related to text messages (SMS rates), and so 
31. Indeed, as infra Section V.A reveals, the welfare effects of discrimination via boilerplate 
provisions hinge on the degree and direction of this proxy's imperfection. 
32. A practice related to hiding benefits in the boilerplate is placing harsh terms in the boi­
lerplate while allowing readers to avoid these terms. This way, the supplier could extract even more 
surplus from nonreaders, who believe they are buying a better product than they actually are. The 
supplier may hesitate to price discriminate in this manner, however, out of the fear of legal interven­
tion. 
33. In a similar vein, consider the various packages offered by credit card companies-low­
interest credit cards, offering 0% introductory APR's; balance transfer cards, transferring a high­
interest balance onto a low APR card; rewards credit cards, rewarding the customer for his pur­
chases; cash-back credit cards, allowing the customer to earn cash back on purchases; prepaid debit 
cards, controlling spending with prepaid debit cards; credit cards for bad credit; and so forth. For a 
comparison between the different packages offered by various credit card firms, see Credit­
Cards.com, http://www.creditcards.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
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forth, in a way that it is difficult for a consumer to calculate which package 
is better. 34 
In this example, those who would incur the transaction costs and get the 
better deals are probably those who use their cellular phones more and 
therefore have more to gain from thoroughly exploring all of the available 
options. They could also be the more sophisticated consumers, who can eas­
ily understand the differences among the various options and choose the one 
most suitable to their needs. One could speculate that one of the reasons for 
offering so many packages with so many different features is price discrimi­
nation in favor of such customers. According to this theory, the cellular firm 
makes things complicated in order to offer better deals to high-volume or 
sophisticated users, who would often be more sensitive to the price they are 
required to pay. Other users, either because they are less sophisticated, or 
because they find the transaction costs prohibitively high since they have 
little at stake, might take the services at higher prices and sometimes get 
inferior services, without being aware of it. 
3. Dependency 
At times, the supplier could extract even more surplus from those who 
are more willing to pay by increasing transaction costs, through boilerplate 
language or otherwise, in order to create dependency of those consumers on 
the supplier. Dependency encourages such consumers to ask for the sup­
plier's assistance, resulting in the purchase of more services and products. 
Common examples are computer accessories and programs, which some 
consumers find hard to use without the supplier's assistance. At times, the 
need for assistance is a natural consequence of the complexity of the prod­
uct. But it sometimes seems that suppliers make things more complex than 
necessary. For example, sometimes manuals for computer applications seem 
to be inaccessible to unsophisticated users.35 The same phenomenon is ap­
parent with respect to do-it-yourself products. W hile experienced consumers 
would be able to handle the accompanying instructions, which might be 
made artificially complex, and assemble the product, less experienced con­
sumers would not be able to do so and would ask (and pay) for the 
supplier's assistance. 36 
34. Consider, for example, the services offered by U.S. Cellular. U.S. Cellular, 
http://www.uscc.com/uscellular/SilverStream/Pages/b_plan.html?zip=96006&mkt=60681 0&tm=O 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2006). For a sophisticated comparison between various wireless phones and 
plans, see Get Connected, Wireless Phones and Plans, http://www.getconnected.com/v_wireless/ 
w_common_geography.asp?caller=/v _ wireless/index.asp%3Ftag%3Dp I %26 (last visited Nov. 30, 
2005). 
35. The "Help" devices of Microsoft Office programs are too complicated for some users, 
who would prefer to pay for support or to learn about operation of the programs in special courses. 
36. See, for example, a statement by IKEA that "IKEA products are generally easy to assem­
ble and require no special tools.  If you prefer, most IKEA stores can refer you to a reputable, 
reasonably priced assembly company that can come to your home to assemble and install our prod­
ucts." IKEA, IKEA FAQs, http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/customer_service/faq/faq.html#0004 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2005). We are not arguing here that IKEA artificially creates such transaction 
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Accordingly, making the use of products artificially more complex re­
sults in price discrimination between sophisticated and unsophisticated, or 
experienced and inexperienced, consumers. Assuming that in these kinds of 
cases the unsophisticated (or inexperienced) consumers are less sensitive to 
the price they are required to pay, or less aware of the additional price they 
would have to pay for the supplier's assistance, the supplier could extract 
payments from these consumers that she would not have been able to extract 
but for the transaction costs she artificially created. At the same time, the 
supplier manages to retain sophisticated consumers with less willingness to 
pay.37 As with the case in which benefits are hidden in boilerplate provi­
sions, here the "benefit" enjoyed by those willing and able to incur the 
transaction costs involved in reading and understanding the instructions is 
the ability to save the additional payment to the supplier for additional ser­
vices. 
4. Price Discrimination and Competitive Pressures 
Could these forms of price discrimination through boilerplate terms sur­
vive competitive pressures? If nonreaders of boilerplate provisions also do 
not take the time to compare suppliers' competing offers, then no matter 
how many suppliers compete with each other, there is no point in setting 
competitive terms in the salient part of their contracts, because nonreaders 
of boilerplate provisions do not compare suppliers anyway.38 This implies 
that if a large enough number of nonreaders of boilerplate provisions do not 
compare competing suppliers, hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions in­
duces the supplier to raise the price he charges nonreaders. It further implies 
that this incentive would remain intact regardless of the number of the sup­
plier's competitors. In such cases, even absent tacit or explicit collusion 
between suppliers, it is in each supplier's  self interest to raise prices above 
competitive levels to nonreaders. 
However, if a large enough number of nonreaders of boilerplate provi­
sions do compare suppliers' offers, competitive pressure between suppliers 
could induce suppliers to try to steal nonreaders from one another via the 
salient terms in their contracts.39 In such a case, discrimination via 
costs. We are merely referring to the possibility that it could benefit IKEA to do so under certain 
circumstances. 
37. This could explain why suppliers sometimes use transaction costs and boilerplate lan­
guage to create the dependency of some consumers on their additional services rather than explicitly 
tying the product and the additional services. With explicit tying, the supplier might lose sophisti­
cated consumers, whereas such consumers could be retained when the supplier merely uses 
boilerplate language and transaction costs. Another reason could be that an explicit tie-in of the 
supplier's product and service is illegal. 
38. In economic models of price matching, it has indeed been shown that the discrimination 
inherent in price matching-between consumers who cite rival prices and those who do not­
survives in markets with many firms and may even be exacerbated the more firms there are in the 
market. See Edlin, supra note 26, at 543; 1.P.L. Png & D. Hirshleifer, Price Discrimination Through 
Offers to Match Price, 60 J. Bus. 365, 372-74 (1987). 
39. See Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REv. EcoN. 
STUD. 543 (1979) (showing that when a large enough percentage of consumers compare suppliers, 
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boilerplate prov1s1ons requires an oligopolistic setting, (that is, that the 
number of substantial suppliers competing with each other is small). Such a 
market is susceptible to tacit or explicit collusion between suppliers. As we 
show in Section 11.C, hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions indeed helps 
facilitate such collusion over the terms offered to nonreaders. 
Note also that the more artificial and cumbersome are the transaction 
costs readers need to incur, the more competing suppliers would tend to re­
duce the level of these transaction costs in order to steal readers from one 
another. After all, even a reader would prefer a supplier whose special dis­
counts, for example, involve less transaction costs, to a supplier whose 
special discounts involve more transaction costs. If the market is competi­
tive enough and a large enough number of readers exists, such competitive 
pressures could reduce the transaction costs imposed on all consumers to 
zero, so that discrimination between readers and nonreaders is dissipated. In 
this sense, even if many nonreaders do not compare suppliers, discrimina­
tion via boilerplate language requires either collusion between suppliers or 
at least that suppliers possess some degree of market power. Such market 
power could stem, for example, from product differentiation40 or from ca-
• 
• 41 pac1ty constramts. 
5 .  "Drawing " Beneficial Tenns 
Thus far, we have discussed price discrimination based on the different 
effects transaction costs have on different consumers. The virtue to the sup­
plier of this mode of discrimination is that it induces consumers to reveal 
themselves as readers or nonreaders of boilerplate provisions. The supplier 
uses this revelation to deduce whether a consumer has low or high willing­
ness to pay for the product. At times, however, the supplier could do better 
by identifying consumers with low willingness to pay in other ways (for 
example, according to their behavior in the supplier's shop), and "drawing" 
the beneficial boilerplate terms in their favor.42 
To illustrate the "drawing" mode of price discrimination, we use Exam­
ple 4 (special discount). In this example, a TV-set seller incorporates a 
suppliers are induced to charge competitive prices). Wilde and Schwartz assume in their model that 
each supplier charges all consumers the same price. In contrast, we explore cases in which the sup­
plier can charge readers of boilerplate language lower prices than he charges nonreaders. This is 
why when most nonreaders also do not compare suppliers, suppliers are induced to raise prices to 
nonreaders, notwithstanding competitive pressures. 
40. With product differentiation, readers that prefer the supplier's brand to competing brands 
will be willing to incur some transaction costs and stick with the supplier's brand. See generally 
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 280 (1988). 
41. In the case of capacity constraints (that is, constraints on the quantity the supplier is able 
to supply, such as limited plant size, limited distribution channels, and so forth), suppliers cannot 
reduce transaction costs imposed upon readers to zero, since then they would not have the capacity 
to serve all readers that would flow to them. This too grants suppliers some degree of market power. 
See generally id. at 215-16. 
42. There also could be particular consumers the supplier wants to benefit for other reasons. 
For example, the supplier might fear that some consumers who have not received the benefits would 
find out about them later and would retaliate by not transacting with the supplier anymore. 
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boilerplate term providing that a consumer who fills out a form and mails it 
to the supplier receives a special discount. Instead of hiding this term from 
all consumers, hoping the "right" consumers will read and understand it, the 
supplier could reveal the provision only to hesitant consumers. 
The same tactic could be used by the supplier in Example 5 (the cellular 
packages), and also in cases where the supplier intends to offer beneficial 
terms to new consumers or to old consumers who consider switching to an­
other supplier, but not to old consumers who do not consider such a switch. 
Instead of explicitly limiting the applicability of the beneficial terms to new 
consumers or those who consider a switch to a new supplier, thereby frus­
trating other faithful consumers, the supplier could draw the beneficial terms 
from the boilerplate any time she believes it is beneficial for her to do so. 
Old consumers who have not received the benefit would sometimes be able 
to receive it later after discovering it in the boilerplate, and, in any case, they 
would be less frustrated, because they would believe it was their fault (not 
noticing the beneficial boilerplate term) and not the supplier's fault (having 
offered the beneficial boilerplate term to all consumers). The case of the 
international-call carriers we discussed above43 could serve as a possible 
illustration also for such cases. 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the advantage to the supplier in 
incorporating a beneficial boilerplate term and drawing upon it when neces­
sary, instead of simply offering it to the appropriate consumers without 
incorporating it as a boilerplate term. This way the supplier could avoid re­
putational sanctions or retaliation by frustrated consumers who have not 
enjoyed the benefits offered to other consumers. 
C. Hiding Benefits Granted to Selected Consumers 
In Section l.B, we discussed the role of boilerplate language and the 
transaction costs generated through it in segmenting consumers for the pur­
pose of price discrimination. Here, we deal with a related issue: sometimes 
there are privileged consumers who are entitled to benefits beyond what 
most consumers expect. These benefits could be granted outside, and inde­
pendently of, boilerplate language. Still, the supplier would often like to 
understate these benefits in order to avoid frustrating the consumers who do 
not receive them. Moreover, sometimes consumers who are aware of the 
benefits granted to others but not to them rightly suspect that they may be 
subsidizing those benefits by paying more, or receiving less, than the bene­
fited consumers. Example 6 illustrates this point. 
Example 6. Frequent-Flyer Miles. An airline grants privileges to passen­
gers for high mileage ("frequent flyers"). Many passengers are not and 
will not be entitled to the privileges, since they do not fly frequently 
enough. In all of the airline's forms, which establish the legal relation­
ship between the airline and the passengers, the privileges for frequent 
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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flyers are understated. However, the airline directly mails frequent flyers 
all the relevant details concerning the privileges they are entitled to. 
In Example 6, the airline might hint in the forms distributed to all con­
sumers about the existence of a "frequent flyer" status, urging those who are 
interested in more details to call the company for further information.44 
D. Collecting Information about Consumers ' Preferences 
As noted, suppliers are often unaware of consumers' willingness to pay 
for the product, so they use boilerplate language and transaction costs in 
order to induce each consumer to reveal her willingness to pay. Suppliers 
would often like consumers to reveal not only their willingness to pay, but 
also their preferences. This information helps suppliers market their prod­
ucts and services to new consumers, but is also useful in planning the 
performance of the contract or future marketing efforts vis-a-vis their exist­
ing consumers. Occasionally, boilerplate language and the imposition of 
transaction costs could serve as useful and reliable tools for extracting this 
information from consumers. In certain cases, the information collected 
could be sold to other suppliers, who could use it for their own businesses. 
As we will immediately see through Example 7, transaction costs play once 
again an important role in achieving the supplier's goals. 
Example 7. Learning the Attractiveness of Services. A cellular phone 
company is interested in learning the attractiveness to consumers of vari­
ous services. To achieve this goal, the company makes these services 
available to consumers, conditioned upon some transaction costs they 
must incur in order to get these services. For example, the company 
could ask consumers to order services through a process that requires 
them to read and learn instructions placed in boilerplate language, to fill 
out long and time-consuming forms, and so forth.45 
44. Northwest Airlines, for example, grants its frequent fliers significant benefits and dis­
counts, but the client has to fill out a special form in order to enroll as a frequent flier, and the 
enrollment information is not prominent on Northwest's Internet site. Nw. Airlines, Enroll in 
WorldPerks-U.S. Residents, https://www.nwa.com/cgi-bin/wp_enroll.pro?Country=US (last vis­
ited Dec. 6, 2005). A similar practice is adopted by American Airlines. Am. Airlines, 
Advantage Terms & Conditions, https://www.aa.com/content/AAdvantage/programDetails/ 
termsAndConditions/termsAndConditions.jhtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2005). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that frequent fliers of these airlines receive more salient information via direct mail. 
Similarly, an Israeli virtual "mall," Nana Shops, declares in its boilerplate Terms of Sale that 
the customers of the Internet provider Netvision are entitled to special privileges from time to time. 
Terms of Sale, art. 15,  http://www.nanashops.co.il/disclaimer.php (last visited Jan. 3 1 ,  2006). Analo­
gous examples are the exclusive "Platinum" and "Gold" clubs offered by different credit card 
companies to their VIP customers. For instance, see the long forms required to apply for a Blue 
Cash card-an exclusive American Express credit card. American Express, Get Blue, https:// 
www66.americanexpress.com/cards/Applyfservlet?csi=38nOI l /b/57/23294 15368/232032305522/ 
O/n&PID=l &EAID=EhraRx8K%2FBE-gRzAzq6fakkj%2AuCJ wExC4g&CRTV=CCGBLUOOOO 
1 102&PSKU=CCGBLU&afflSID=EhraRx8K%2FBE (last visited Jan. 9, 2006). 
45. See, for example, the membership forms of DriverGuide, a web site that enables mem­
bers to download drivers for various computer programs. The service is free of charge, but in order 
to download a driver, the user must become a member. As part of the registration process, the web 
site offers different computer products, some of which are free of charge. In order to proceed with 
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Had the cellular phone company not conditioned the availability of the 
various services upon incurring the transaction costs, most consumers would 
order these services and the cellular phone company would know very little 
about their preferences. Arguably, the company could collect payment for 
each service, even a small one, thereby achieving the same goal at a lower 
cost (or even with a gain) to itself. But even if this strategy could be useful 
on some occasions, the strategy of imposing transaction costs described in 
Example 7 could be more useful on other occasions. First, in some cases the 
company would find it too costly to monitor each and every use of the ser­
vice and then calculate the appropriate payment for such use. But more 
importantly, the main advantage of the imposition of transaction costs over 
charging a payment is that many consumers would be willing to bear the 
transaction costs but not to pay the cellular phone company for additional 
services it offers. This is so not only because many people care more about 
their money than they care about their time,46 but also because consumers 
might not trust a company that asks to be paid for such services, suspecting 
that the company is trying to make additional profits at their expense. Learn­
ing about consumers' preferences for different services via transaction costs 
rather than via payment for services can thus be seen as an aggressive com­
petitive move on the part of the cellular phone company: the additional 
services are granted free of charge, while the transaction costs are used to 
ensure that only consumers especially interested in a service would use it. 
A cheap and reliable way to learn about consumer preferences is through 
the Internet. In cases where consumers are required to surf from one link to 
another to search for the goods or the services they want to buy, thereby 
incurring transaction costs, it is relatively easy to track a consumer's moves 
from one page to another and learn about her preferences even if eventually 
she buys nothing.47 
II. PREVENTION OF COMPETITION AND CARTEL STABILIZATION 
A. Introduction: When Is Tacit Collusion Sustainable ? 
In many industries, particularly oligopolies (that is, industries with only 
a few substantial firms), tacit or explicit collusion becomes possible.48 W hile 
explicit collusion can often be deterred by antitrust law, it is well known that 
firms can sustain a cartel-like price even absent explicit communication 
the registration process, the user must click "yes" or "no" near the product icon. In addition, the user 
must answer which newsletters containing special offers and discounts she wishes to receive. The 
user specifies her fields of interest by clicking on the relevant fields and by deciding which product 
she wishes to receive free of charge at the end of the process. The possibility of skipping the process 
of choosing the newsletters and the free item is provided in fine print, not reasonably observable to 
many users. See DriverGuide, supra note 13. 
46. See Duxbury et al., supra note 15. 
47. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 471-72 (arguing that businesses that use the 
Internet collect a tremendous amount of data on their potential consumers-including their willing­
ness to read and shop for terms-and may use it, among other things, for price discrimination). 
48. See, e.g., TiROLE, supra note 40, at 239-70. 
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between them (hereinafter, tacit collusion).49 This is because, given that all 
firms charge a collusive price, each firm faces a trade-off between the short­
term gain that it could make by deviating from the collusive price and stealing 
market share from its rivals and the long-term loss that would evolve from the 
price war that would be triggered.so If all firms are such that their long-term 
loss from a price war outweighs their short-term gain from cutting prices, 
tacit collusion becomes sustainable, to the detriment of consumers. If, on the 
other hand, one or more of the firms finds price cutting so profitable that it 
outweighs the long-term loss from a price war, tacit collusion breaks down, 
and competitive pricing evolves. In fact, the firm most eager to cut prices is 
the only firm whose incentives matter. If it prefers to cut prices, collusion 
breaks down, and if it prefers not to cut prices, collusion is sustainable.st 
Antitrust agencies call such firms "maverick firms."s2 
Note that the industry maverick's eagerness to cut prices may be more of 
a vice than a virtue. The maverick's gains from price cutting can be pro­
duced only if a collusive price is in place. However, since the maverick's 
rivals often know of its eagerness to cut prices, they may well refrain from 
charging a collusive price to begin with, if they fear that the maverick would 
then undercut this price and steal their customers. In such cases, collusion is 
not sustainable, and all firms, including the maverick, usually earn lower 
profits than they could have earned had collusion been sustainable. 
Accordingly, the maverick could raise its profits by making collusion 
sustainable. In order to do so, it needs to commit to becoming less eager to 
cut prices. 
In what follows, we shall show how boilerplate provisions in contracts 
or the imposition of transaction costs could be used to facilitate explicit or 
tacit collusion. 
B. Making It Difficult to Compare among Rivals 
Firms in various industries often tend to make the terms of sale included 
in their boilerplate provisions complicated and difficult for consumers to 
understand or assess. We claim that such complexity can harm competition. 
Let us illustrate by using the following example: 
49. Although earlier cases may have been understood as considering mere parallel pricing as 
an agreement violating section 1 of the Sherman Act, see, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 ( 1939), it 
became clear in later cases that absent some evidence of communication or coordination, the agree­
ment requirement of this section is not met. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 
537, 541 ( 1954); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'JI 75,253 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974). 
50. See supra note 48. 
51. See David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. I, 
17-18 (2000); David Gilo, Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, Panial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collu­
sion, 37 RAND J. EcoN. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 13, on file with author). 
52. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 FED. REG. 41,553, 4 1,559-60 (Sept. JO, 
1992). 
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Example 8. Complex Cellular Contracts. Two cellular firms, firm A and 
firm B, compete and both offer a menu of packages : each package differs 
from the others with regard to factors such as rate per minute, monthly fee, 
night rate, SMS rates, and so forth, in a way that makes it difficult for a 
consumer to calculate which supplier offers a better deal. 
In the following subsections, we shall discuss three anticompetitive ef­
fects that could stem from such complexity of contracts. The first is the 
facilitation of collusion, the second is the raising of prices even absent col­
lusion, and the third is entry deterrence. 
1 .  Facilitation of Collusion 
The complexity of the contracts in Example 8 could contribute to the 
stability of noncompetitive terms. If both cellular firms offer noncompetitive 
terms, the profits one of them could make by offering more competitive 
terms are small, since many consumers would find it difficult to assess 
whether the complex terms offered by their current cellular provider are 
better than the competing offer. For example, suppose firm A tries to offer a 
benefit with regard to one or some of its packages. How can a customer of 
firm B know if firm A is offering him a better deal? In order to do so, tedi­
ous calculations are needed. Even if she manages to learn which of A's 
packages is best for her, she needs to assess all of the parameters in B's  
packages and compare them with the way A's offer deals with these issues. 
The customer does not want to make a hasty decision since she typically has 
to incur costs in switching suppliers. 
Accordingly, many consumers would hesitate to move from firm B to 
firm A. This makes a price cut or other competitive benefit offered by A 
much less profitable. Not only is A possibly triggering a costly price war in 
the long run, but the gain it could make by stealing customers in the short 
run may be very small. To be sure, A could try to advertise and explain in 
detail how all of its possible packages are better than all of B's packages, 
but such an offer would be costly. Note that the most profitable way to devi­
ate from collusive terms is to offer only a slight benefit compared to the 
rival with a hope of stealing as many of the rival's customers as possible. 
But with complex contracts, a slight and subtle benefit cannot steal many 
customers, because they fail to assess it. In order to offer consumers a sim­
ple deal that is bluntly better than each and every one of B's different and 
various packages, A would need to offer an extreme benefit. But while offer­
ing a large benefit compared to B could steal substantial market share from 
B, A's profits per unit made during the price cut would be much lower than 
those A makes during collusion.53 The less profitable such a defection from 
collusion becomes, the less likely it is to overcome the expected long-term 
53. An alternative strategy for A could be to offer a simple contract with what A knows to be 
a subtle improvement compared to B.  However, many customers would not switch to A merely 
because his contract is simple, and would require a value-based comparison before switching. As 
noted, such a comparison is prohibitively costly when B's contract is complex. 
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losses from the price war that would follow. B would be similarly less in­
clined to cut prices. The same goes for A and B 's incentives to compete over 
new customers. If a new customer finds it impossible to compare the two 
offers, there is no need for them to compete over her. 
Note that unlike consumers, firms A and B would not find it hard to as­
sess whether their rival has deviated from a collusive equilibrium. After all, 
A and B are sophisticated and have a lot at stake. Accordingly, it cannot be 
said that contract complexity could make A and B more eager to cut prices, 
because their rival would not know about the price cut. As long as deviat!on 
from a collusive scheme is made vis-a-vis end consumers, it is readily de­
tectable by a rival firm, regardless of contract complexity. 54 
Such complex contracts support an equilibrium in which competition is 
less fierce, and profits, accordingly, higher. Note that this effect of contract 
complexity exists whether or not suppliers mean it to facilitate collusion. It 
could be that contracts are complex for other reasons. Still, the effect is the 
same: improved sustainability of collusive terms.55 
We found several examples of oligopolistic markets in which competing 
suppliers offer extremely complex contracts. Cellcom, for example, the 
leading Israeli cellular provider, with a thirty-four percent market share,56 
has given consumers an option to elect one of seven different packages. 
Consumers may switch between these packages at will at no extra cost. The 
packages differ from each other (some only slightly) with regard to various 
parameters, including the monthly fixed fee; rate per minute; number of 
people that the consumer may call at a cheaper rate per minute; times of day 
or days in which the rate is lower; number of minutes per month above 
which the rate per minute is lower; the rates for additional services such as 
SMS messages, downloads, ringtones, or Internet; the rates for calls to other 
networks or fixed line phones; and so forth. Each of the packages features, 
on average, nine parameters needed in order to calculate the attractiveness 
of the package. Similarly complex are the packages sold by Orange, Cell­
com's rival of almost equal size, with a thirty-two percent market share. 
Orange has seventeen different packages that again, on average, require the 
consumer to assess nine different parameters in order to calculate the value 
of the deal he will obtain. Two of the packages are displayed in a forty-six 
column, fifty-three row table. 
54. It could be claimed that the collusive scheme itself is more difficult for A and B to coor­
dinate when contracts are complex. However, in an oligopolistic setting, once, at a certain stage, A 
and B 's packages are supracompetitive (say because one of them introduced such packages and the 
other tacitly followed by offering such packages), they would be less likely to deviate and offer 
competitive packages. 
55. That said, if indeed the complexity of the contracts facilitates collusion, suppliers should 
probably be presumed to intend, or at least take account of, the reasonable effects of their behavior. 
56. The data was taken from YNET, an electronic newspaper. Posting of Omri Levi to 
http://www.ynet.co.il/home/l ,  7340,L-876- 1 805 1 - 1 290891 1 ,00.html (July 28, 2005, 2 1  :28 Israeli 
time). 
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Similar complexities exist in other markets, such as some long-distance 
and cellular phone markets in the United States.57 
2. Raising Prices Even Absent Collusion 
Interestingly, complexity of contracts also typically raises the prices that 
would prevail absent collusion. As is well known, in markets with only a 
few firms, even absent ongoing collusion, prices will often exceed marginal 
costs. Common reasons for this are product differentiation (that is, consum­
ers do not see the competing products as perfect substitutes)58 and capacity 
constraints (that is, firms are not able to lower prices all the way down to 
marginal costs, due to their capacity constraints).59 
Consumers' difficulties in fully understanding the value they get from a 
supplier, and their consequent difficulties in comparing suppliers, can enable 
suppliers in such industries, even absent collusion, to raise prices even fur­
ther above marginal costs. Suppose, for example, that in the market 
discussed in Example 8, the equilibrium price when contracts are easy to 
understand is $ 1 0  per unit. That is, none of the cellular firms wishes to raise 
its price above $ 10, because they fear that then too many consumers would 
prefer the competing supplier, and the supplier attempting the price raise 
would lose too many customers to justify the elevated profit per unit. 
Now suppose, however, that the cellular firms change their contracts so 
that it becomes more difficult for consumers to compare between them. It is 
quite intuitive that this would give the cellular firms the power to profitably 
raise prices, say, to $1 1 per unit. If firm A, for example, charges $1 1 al­
though firm B charges only $ 10, many of the consumers would find it hard 
to verify that the deal they receive from A, weighed according to all of its 
other complex parameters, is worse than the deal they get from B .  Even 
though B's  price per unit is somewhat lower, many consumers would not 
switch to it. This could make the price hike by A profitable. The same goes 
for firm B, which may also find it profitable to charge $ 1 1  per unit.6() Indeed, 
various economic models find that elevated search costs, which consumers 
57. See CONSUMER & Gov'TAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED. COMMC'Ns CoMM'N, CELL PHONES: 
HELPING CONSUMERS MAKE SENSE OF THE MARKET (2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
cgb/cell_phones.html (noting that choosing a cellular phone plan can be overwhelming, and review­
ing factors important to consumers in selecting a plan). The complexity of the cellular phone market 
is prominent in the various sites comparing the cellular package offered by different cellular provid­
ers. See, e.g. , Consumer Search, Wireless Plans Reviews, http://www.consumersearch.com/www/ 
electronics/wireless-plans-reviews/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2006); Phone Dog, Free Cell Phones & 
Great Specials, http://www.phonedog.com/cell-phone-shopping/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 
2006); Wireless Guide, Comparison Shopping for Cell Phones, http://www.wirelessguide.org/ 
phone/comparison-shopping.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). Such sites could be viewed as a market 
reaction to deal, although imperfectly, with the extreme complexity of firms' contracts. 
58. See TiROLE, supra note 40, at 294-95. 
59. See id. at 209-38; see also supra note 4 1 .  
60. This also applies to nonprice terms of the contract. When contracts are complex, suppli­
ers are less hesitant to offer poorer nonprice terms, as they do not expect to lose much market share 
when they do so. 
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need to bear in order to compare between competing suppliers, have the 
effect of raising prices in oligopolies, even absent ongoing collusion.61 
Interestingly, the effect of raising prices absent collusion may serve to 
help collusion break down and thus counteracts the effect discussed in Sec­
tion II.B. l ,  above. This is because if complexity of contracts raises prices 
and profits absent collusion, and if firms charge such prices when collusion 
breaks down, the long-term losses they suffer from a price war would be 
smaller, and they would be less hesitant to cut prices. According to this rea­
soning, complexity of contracts may have an ambiguous effect on the 
prospects of collusion: on the one hand, as identified in Section II.B. l ,  it 
makes collusion more sustainable by lowering the short-term gains from 
price cutting. On the other hand, as identified in the current Section, it 
makes collusion less sustainable, by lowering the long-term loss from the 
price war that evolves when collusion breaks down. Two caveats are in 
place, however. First, it is quite unlikely that firms would make their con­
tracts artificially complex if this causes collusion to break down. 
Accordingly, if we observe artificially complex contracts, it is plausible to 
assume that either collusion is sustainable or that it would be unsustainable 
even absent the complexity. Second, as some economic studies show, firms 
may be able to adopt strategies in which price wars are more painful than a 
mere reversion to the prices that would have evolved in equilibrium absent 
collusion. 62 For example, during a price war, contracts could become simple 
and profits accordingly lower. If such strategies are adopted, only the collu­
sion facilitating effect of complexity remains. 
3. Entry Deterrence 
Complexity of contracts can also serve as a barrier to entry of new firms 
into the market. Suppose that a new entrant, firm C, wishes to enter the 
market portrayed in Example 8. Firm C would find it hard to steal customers 
away from the incumbent cellular firms, because their customers would find 
it hard to verify that firm C is indeed offering them a better deal. Firm C 
could make an effort to explain its advantages to consumers, but this would 
be costly and possibly ineffective, and would, again, reduce the expected 
profits from entry, and make it less likely. 63 
6 1 .  See Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: 
A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model, 30 RAND J. EcoN. 7 1 9  ( 1999) (showing that prices in 
oligopoly rise when search costs rise). These results have also been supported empirically. See 
Christopher R. Knittel, Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs, Switching Costs, and Market 
Power, 1 2  REV. INous. 0RG. 5 1 9  ( 1997) (showing that search costs and switching costs have en­
abled long-distance carriers in the United States to raise prices after the dissolution of AT&T). 
62. See Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. EcoN. THEORY 
1 9 1  (1986). 
63. Note that not all firms need to offer complex contracts in order for the anticompetitive 
effects of complexity to exist. As long as complexity is abundant enough, it would be useless for a 
rival offering a simple contract to try to steal customers from suppliers who offer complex contracts. 
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C. How Can Beneficial Boilerplate Terms Facilitate Collusion ? 
1 .  Collusion over Harsh Boilerplate Terms versus Collusion 
with Beneficial Boilerplate Terms 
It is understandable that a monopolistic supplier may want to use a 
value-reducing boilerplate provision, which many consumers do not read, 
hoping that consumers who do not read the provision would be willing to 
buy the supplier's product for a relatively high price, while they would not 
have bought it for that price had they read the harsh provision. How can 
such value-reducing terms be sustained, however, in markets in which more 
than one significant supplier compete with each other? In such markets, if 
one supplier attempts to include value-reducing boilerplate terms in his con­
tracts, the competing supplier may be tempted to highlight this fact in his 
advertisements, offer consumers a better deal, and steal them away from the 
first supplier.64 As noted, however, in oligopolistic markets, tacit collusion 
over value-reducing terms (or supra-competitive prices) could be sustain­
able. Let us illustrate using the following example: 
Example 9. Collusion over Harsh Terms. Firms Alpha and Beta compete 
with each other in selling televisions. They tacitly or explicitly collude 
over placing a boilerplate term in their contracts according to which once a 
television is bought and used, it is nonrefundable. 
The question whether collusion between Alpha and Beta is sustainable 
in the current context hinges on the comparison between the parties' short­
term gain during a deviation from collusion and their long-term loss from 
the price war that would evolve. The short-term gain would involve the prof­
its either of them (say, Alpha) could make by highlighting its rival's harsh 
boilerplate term, offering refunds for returned televisions, and stealing busi­
ness. The price war that would be triggered would involve Beta fighting 
back, canceling the value-reducing boilerplate term, and offering refunds or 
even more overreaching benefits or price cuts. This would cause the terms 
of the suppliers' contracts to be competitive, and in the long run, they would 
forego the collusive profits they could have made had collusion not broken 
down. If, for both Alpha and Beta, the long-term loss from a price war out­
weighs the short-term profit from price cutting, collusion over the harsh 
boilerplate term would be sustainable. If, on the other hand, for either Alpha 
or Beta, the short-term profit from price cutting outweighs the long-term 
loss from a price war, collusion would break down. 
64. Unlike us, Korobkin implicitly assumes that the saliency of the terms is given exoge­
nously. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1 206. This drives his conclusion that 
"[ w ]hile sellers have an economic incentive to provide the efficient level of quality for the attributes 
buyers consider ("salient" attributes), they have an incentive to make attributes buyers do not con­
sider ("non-salient" attributes) favorable to themselves." Id. Our point in the text, however, is that 
the saliency of terms is, for the most part, endogenous: a supplier could snatch business from his 
rival by highlighting the rival's harsh nonsalient terms. 
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Our next claim, however, is that such tacit collusion over value-reducing 
boilerplate terms could be extremely fragile and would often tend to break 
down. When such collusion breaks down, another form of collusion would 
often be more robust. Under this other form of collusion, suppliers could 
offer collusive terms to everyone but the readers of boilerplate provisions, 
who would be offered more competitive and attractive terms. This is illus­
trated in Example 10: 
Example JO. Collusion with Beneficial Boilerplate Provisions. Finns Alpha 
and Beta compete with each other in the sale of televisions. They tacitly or 
explicitly collude on the terms offered to all consumers, but both offer, in a 
boilerplate provision, a special competitive discount to consumers who fill 
out a certain form and mail it to the supplier. Only consumers who read the 
boilerplate carefully, remember to fill out the form, and mail it enjoy the 
special discount. 
In what follows, we will explain why this other form of collusion would 
be more sustainable, and, at times, also a more profitable way to collude, 
than that of Example 9 above. As Section II.A reveals, collusion is more 
sustainable the less profitable are the deviations from collusion and the more 
profitable is collusion itself (that is, the more harmful are price-wars in 
which collusive profits are forgone). With collusion over value-reducing 
boilerplate terms, as in Example 9, the short-term gain from deviating from 
collusion is the business a supplier is able to steal by highlighting his rival's 
value-reducing boilerplate term and offering a better deal. He can then steal 
two kinds of consumers: readers of boilerplate terms, who are aware of the 
nonrefund clause, and nonreaders of the boilerplate terms, who find out 
about the term only when the deviating supplier highlights it. Note that these 
short-term profits from deviation are potentially large.65 Not only can devia­
tion steal both readers and nonreaders of the boilerplate terms, but 
consumers might develop antagonism about a supplier that until then tried to 
abuse them via value-reducing boilerplate terms. 
In addition, one cannot ignore the harsh legal treatment toward value­
reducing boilerplate terms. To the extent that such terms can be invalidated 
by law, collusion over them again becomes fragile. It is enough if one of the 
suppliers' value reducing boilerplate terms are invalidated by a court for 
such collusion to break down. The supplier whose terms were invalidated 
would potentially steal market share from rival suppliers; there would be 
competitive pressure on these rival suppliers to remove their value-reducing 
terms as well, even if they were not attacked in court. 
Now consider Example 10, in which suppliers offer collusive terms to 
everyone but the readers of boilerplate provisions, who pay the competitive 
price thanks to the special discounts. Here, deviating from collusion (that is, 
by offering discounts not only to readers of the boilerplate provision, but to 
all customers), becomes much less profitable for several reasons. First, such 
65. Of course, "large" is a relative term. We shall claim below that the collusion portrayed in 
Example 10 is more stable than the collusion portrayed in Example 9, particularly because the prof­
its from deviation from the collusion in Example 10 are smaller. 
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deviation has the potential of stealing only nonreaders of the boilerplate 
provision, since readers of the boilerplate provision already enjoy the spe­
cial discounts, and thus have no reason to prefer the deviating supplier.66 
Second, even the nonreaders of the boilerplate provision would not neces­
sarily switch to the deviating supplier. Their original supplier could retain 
them by pointing out to them that the special discount was in their contract 
(in a boilerplate) all along. This would also minimize consumer antagonism. 
Consumers would not feel they have been deceived but merely that they 
have not done such a good job at reading their contract. Third, the chance 
that deviation is motivated by an attempt to exclude competitors is smaller. 
At times, suppliers deviate from collusion because they hope to exclude 
their rivals completely by setting terms their rivals cannot match, say, due to 
cost constraints. Supplier Beta, in Example 9 above (in which there are col­
lusive boilerplate terms), could try to offer salient discounts, or analogous 
benefits, in order to try to drive Alpha out of business. However, in situa­
tions resembling Example 10, in which Alpha is already offering such 
beneficial terms in its boilerplate provisions, Beta receives a credible signal 
as to how efficient Alpha is and how capable it is of offering benefits to con­
sumers. If Alpha has persisted with the beneficial boilerplate provision for a 
considerable period, Beta understands that Alpha is capable of granting such 
benefits to all consumers if competition becomes fierce. This signal could 
deter Beta from trying to exclude Alpha. When exclusion is not an option, 
friendly accommodation of Alpha and collusion with it can become the most 
profitable strategy.67 Accordingly, deviation from collusion over harsh terms 
is more profitable than deviation from collusion with competitive benefits 
hidden in the boilerplate.68 
66. In this sense, hiding benefits in boilerplate language is a stronger facilitator of collusion 
than price-matching policies, in which the supplier promises to match a rival's price cut. With price 
matching, a price matcher's rival can still make considerable profits from deviating from collusion, 
due to consumers' hassle in going to the rival and then back to the price matcher in order to invoke 
the price match. See Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Hassle Costs: The Achilles ' Heel of Price­
Matching Guarantees, 8 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 489 (1999). In contrast, with hidden benefits 
in boilerplate language, the rival cannot steal readers, since they are already enjoying the competi­
tive benefits. 
67. See generally TIROLE, supra note 40, at 305-42 (discussing the above interaction be­
tween exclusion and accommodation of rivals). Note that if Beta is so efficient that he can profitably 
undercut even Alpha's beneficiary terms, exclusion would have occurred with or without the benefi­
cial boilerplate terms. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the beneficial boilerplate terms can prevent 
exclusion of Alpha. All they do is prevent unsuccessful attempts by Beta to exclude Alpha. Argua­
bly, Alpha could try to pretend to be more efficient than it really is by having below-cost boilerplate 
terms. Alpha could cross-subsidize these below-cost terms via the collusive profits it makes at the 
expense of nonreaders of the boilerplate term. This would make Alpha's signal to Beta Jess credible. 
Still, Beta should place a positive probability on the risk that Alpha is not selling to boilerplate 
readers below cost. After all, such cross-subsidization forgoes a substantial portion of Alpha's collu­
sive profits and is therefore costly to Alpha. Accordingly, it is still the case that Beta would be Jess 
likely to try and exclude Alpha. 
68. To be sure, it also should be examined whether collusion over harsh terms is more profit­
able than collusion with beneficial competitive terms, in which case the former may still be more 
sustainable than the latter. On the one hand, with the former type of collusion, the supplier loses 
many readers, who are retained with the latter type of collusion. On the other hand, ignoring the risk 
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Competitive beneficial boilerplate terms as in Example 10 make price 
cutting less profitable not only compared to the collusion portrayed in Ex­
ample 9 (over harsh boilerplate terms), but also compared to a situation 
where Alpha and Beta collude on a uniform price without any boilerplate 
provisions (either harsh or beneficial). In the latter case, if Alpha and Beta 
try to collude on the terms of their contracts, their short-term profits from 
deviating from collusion become larger: the deviating supplier can steal all 
types of consumers-readers and nonreaders of boilerplate provisions alike. 
On the other hand, when they place competitive discounts in their boiler­
plate terms, as in Example 10, a deviating supplier can steal only 
nonreaders. Even nonreaders could remain with their current supplier (with 
no hard feelings toward their supplier) if their current supplier immediately 
makes it apparent to them that they could have enjoyed the benefits hidden 
in their contract all along. Furthermore, as explained above, to the extent a 
supplier wishes to deviate from collusion in order to exclude its rival, it is 
less likely to do so when suppliers can hide benefits in boilerplate provi­
sions. 
Finally, the collusive profits when hiding benefits in boilerplate provi­
sions may well be larger, due to the fact that without benefits hidden in the 
boilerplate, many readers end up not purchasing the product, whereas they 
would have purchased it with the hidden benefits. It is true that readers who 
do purchase the product when Alpha and Beta collude over a uniform price 
pay more than they would have paid had they enjoyed the competitive bene­
fits hidden in the boilerplate. Suppliers, however, always have the option of 
not hiding benefits in their boilerplate. Hence, if they do so in a particular 
case, it could imply that the former effect outweighs the latter effect and that 
it is more profitable to suppliers to hide benefits in the boilerplate than not 
to do so. Alternatively, it might be that suppliers prefer hiding benefits in the 
boilerplate because collusion over a uniform price would break down. One 
way or another, when we observe that suppliers chose to hide benefits in 
their boilerplate, such a practice always improves the prospects of collusion. 
The analysis in this Section could also explain why many suppliers often 
include beneficial boilerplate terms in their contracts. In addition to the 
profits from discrimination, described in Section LB, such a strategy could 
make collusion at the expense of nonreaders of boilerplate provisions more 
sustainable. 
of legal intervention, with the former type of collusion, the supplier extracts more surplus from 
consumers who do decide to purchase from the supplier. 
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D. Using Beneficial Boilerplate Terms as a Signaling Device 
1 .  Encouraging Anticompetitive Accommodation among Rivals 
A related feature of beneficial boilerplate terms is that they can be used 
to encourage anticompetitive accommodation by rivals. By accommodation, 
we mean the opposite of exclusion. Even absent collusion, firms may some­
times compete vigorously with the hope of excluding their rivals and 
gaining dominance in the market in the long run. If they succeed in doing 
so, welfare may be reduced because the structure of the market would be­
come less competitive. On the other hand, if they do not succeed in doing 
so, and the rivals, rather than being excluded, fight back with beneficial 
terms on their own part, welfare is considerably enhanced, as consumers 
enjoy extremely beneficial terms from all suppliers. In such cases, a sup­
plier's forsaken hope of excluding a rival turns out to be welfare-enhancing. 
Our claim here is that including beneficial boilerplate terms in the sup­
plier's contracts could be a relatively cheap way to discourage welfare­
enhancing (unsuccessful) attempts to exclude rivals. The previous Section 
discussed this effect in the context of the sustainability of tacit collusion, 
where an attempt to exclude a rival was seen as motivation for deviating 
from collusion. Here we wish to stress that this anticompetitive effect could 
remain even absent collusion. Take supplier Alpha from Example 10 above, 
which offered a beneficial discount only to readers of its boilerplate lan­
guage. In doing so, Alpha sends a credible signal that it is efficient and 
competent enough to cope with such a discount for a long period. This dis­
courages Beta from trying to compete vigorously, hoping to exclude Alpha.69 
Had Beta been in the dark about how far Alpha could go with such competi­
tive terms, Beta might have competed vigorously, Alpha would have fought 
back by competing vigorously itself, their consumers would have benefited, 
70 and Alpha and Beta would have earned lower profits. 
2. Entry Deterrence 
Beneficial boilerplate terms could also be a device that incumbent firms 
use to deter entry of new rivals. The beneficial terms serve as a credible sig­
nal of the extent of benefits to consumers that the incumbent firm can cope 
with. Consider Example 10, in which both Alpha and Beta offer boilerplate 
terms with discounts. A potential entrant, Gamma, observes these terms and 
receives a credible signal as to how far Alpha and Beta could go with re­
spect to all consumers in order to fight Gamma if it decides to enter. Absent 
69. As noted, supra note 67, although Alpha could try to "cheat" and disguise itself as an 
extremely efficient firm by offering below-cost discounts in the boilerplate terms, Alpha's signal still 
has considerable credibility. 
70. As noted, supra note 67, if Beta is so efficient that it can profitably undercut even Al­
pha's beneficiary terms, exclusion would have occurred with or without the beneficial boilerplate 
terms. Therefore, there is no welfare-enhancing effect here in discouraging Beta from trying to 
exclude Alpha. 
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such beneficial boilerplate terms, if Gamma is imperfectly informed about 
Alpha and Beta's costs and capabilities, Gamma may place a positive prob­
ability on the possibility that Alpha and Beta are less efficient or capable 
than Gamma is . The odds that Gamma would indeed take its chances and 
enter are then greater. Once Gamma is in the market, it becomes harder for 
Alpha and Beta to drive Gamma out, as Gamma's costs of entry will have 
already been sunk. 
On the other hand, beneficial boilerplate terms could signal to Gamma 
that Alpha and Beta are indeed efficient. The signal is credible because Al­
pha and Beta are already offering these terms to consumers who read the 
boilerplate provisions. If they do so for a relatively long period, it cannot be 
the case that they are not efficient enough or not capable of granting such 
terms without a loss. 71 Gamma then knows that if it enters the market, Alpha 
and Beta could offer the attractive terms to all consumers (readers and non­
readers alike), thereby making entry less profitable and less likely. Absent 
the possibility of beneficial boilerplate terms, such entry deterrence through 
signaling becomes much more costly: Alpha and Beta need to offer better 
deals to all of their customers. 
III. CREATING FALSE APPEARANCES 
A. Creating an Illusion of a Fair Contract 
As noted in the Introduction, in most legal systems, standard-form con­
tracts are subject to judicial review. When courts assess a value-reducing 
term in a standard-form contract, they consider the fairness of the contract in 
its entirety, and not only the particular term.72 Accordingly, a supplier who 
wishes to minimize the chances that a certain term would be struck down 
would try to offset it with beneficial terms, which would help convince the 
court that the contract in its entirety is fair. 
Such offsetting beneficial terms, however, are costly to the supplier. It 
would prefer to "kill two birds with one stone": on the one hand, keep the 
oppressive terms intact, and on the other, not have to bear the full cost of the 
offsetting beneficial terms. The supplier could achieve this by placing the 
beneficial terms in the boilerplate language, so that only those who read and 
fully understand them would actually enjoy them. The supplier can influ­
ence the number of customers that actually enjoy the beneficial terms by 
7 1 .  As noted, supra note 67, Alpha and Beta could try to look even more efficient than they 
actually are by offering below-cost terms to the readers of the boilerplate provisions. But such a 
strategy of incurring Jong-term losses (or sacrificing long-term profits) is often prohibitively costly. 
72. See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 260-66 ( 1999) (explaining that unfairness 
cannot be detected by analyzing specific terms as seemingly unfair because these terms are usually 
concessions granted in exchange for other advantages); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and 
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 1 15 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541 ( 1967) ("[W]hen the question 
is presented as a decision as to the 'unconscionability' of a single contractual provision, the vacu­
ousness of the standard is apparent."). 
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controlling the complexity of their apprehension and "hiding" them deeper 
in boilerplate language. 73 This is illustrated by Example 1 1 :  
Example 11.  Offsetting Benefits. A dry cleaning firm sets a term in its stan­
dard-form contract according to which it will not be responsible for 
damages above a certain low threshold. Alongside this term is a boilerplate 
term providing that a customer interested in purchasing insurance could, 
for a fee, be insured for damages above this threshold, provided he fills out 
a certain form and mails it to the supplier.74 
When attacked about the value-reducing features of the term exempting 
the supplier from liability, the supplier could point out the fact that it is of­
fering any customer who is interested full insurance for a relatively low fee. 
The supplier could claim that his standard-form contract, viewed in its en­
tirety, is fair, and, moreover, efficient, since it induces customers who may 
suffer damages above the low threshold to reveal themselves, and provides 
lower rates for those customers who do not expect to suffer such damages. 
The catch, however, is that this claim assumes complete information on the 
part of consumers. In reality, many consumers with potential damages 
would not be able to comprehend that the insurance option is worthwhile, 
and, moreover, they might not even be aware of the insurance option or of 
the exemption from liability, as both are placed in the boilerplate language. 
Moreover, the transaction costs a customer has to bear in order to assess the 
insurance option, fill out the required form, and mail it to the supplier may 
deter her from exercising this option, even if it is a fair one. Accordingly, the 
supplier could impose transaction costs and use boilerplate language in or­
der to deter most customers from using the insurance option, while still 
being able to use this option as an offsetting benefit in court. 
Many additional examples exist in which suppliers try to create the ap­
pearance of a fair contract while trying to avoid the corresponding costs. A 
typical example is that of contracts in which the customer has the option of 
canceling his subscription or enrollment within a certain trial period or the 
option of returning purchased merchandise. All the supplier needs to do in 
order to avoid most of the costs concerning these seemingly fair benefits 
granted to customers is to hide them in boilerplate language, make them 
difficult for customers to assess or understand, or impose transaction costs 
upon customers who wish to exercise the option.75 
73. Transaction costs that would cause all or most customers not to exercise the beneficial 
option would be an extreme case of the strategy discussed in the text. Costs that cause only some of 
the customers not to exercise the option possibly characterize cases in which the supplier wishes to 
price discriminate in favor of customers who exercise the option, see supra Section LB, while still 
maintaining the appearance of a fair contract in case value-reducing terms in the contract are at­
tacked in court. 
74. CA I n9 Dry Cleaning Factories Keshet Ltd. v. Attorney General [ 1980) IsrSC 34(3) 
365. Also see the analogous terms in the standard-form contract of M.P.L., an Israeli firm, which 
provides storage services in the custom authority's warehouses (on file with the authors). 
7 S. See, e.g., supra note 30 (describing the disconnection policy of the Internet service pro­
vider Speakeasy, found in its boilerplate provisions). Similarly, the standard-form contract of Moked 
Keshev Lev, an Israeli medical center offering its members urgent medical help services, allocates in 
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Finally, suppliers may want to maintain the appearance of a fair contract 
not only in the eyes of courts, but also in the eyes of the press, consumer 
organizations, or competitors who try to criticize the supplier for value­
reducing terms in its standard-form contract. The supplier could then defend 
itself from such criticism by pointing out the offsetting beneficial terms, but 
still use transaction costs and boilerplate language in order not to bear the 
costs of providing the benefits. 
B .  Hiding Benefits from Third Parties 
At times, the supplier wishes to grant certain special benefits to a group 
of people who are parties to the supplier's standard contract, but is inter­
ested in hiding these benefits from third parties. 
Example 12. Hidden Benefits. A university has a standard contract with 
faculty who are inventors. The contract determines the inventors' rights 
and grants them certain special benefits. The terms of the contract, how­
ever, are obscure and difficult to understand. 
A possible explanation for the obscurity of the contract in Example 12  is 
that the university does not want faculty members who do not have a chance 
of being inventors to observe the extreme benefits granted to the inventors. 
Moreover, the obscurity of the contract could help prevent public criticism 
of the practice. 
IV. A CREDIBLE SIGNAL FOR NOT NEGOTIATING 
In many cases a supplier would like to signal to his customers or his 
competitors that certain terms in the contract, or at times, the whole con­
tract, are not negotiable. We claim that the supplier could impose transaction 
costs upon himself, usually with the aid of standard-form contracts, in order 
to credibly commit not to negotiate his contracts. Non-negotiability of con­
tracts could serve various purposes. We focus here on three purposes that 
have received less attention. 
A.  Signaling Improved Incentives 
Non-negotiability of contractual terms could signal that the supplier's 
improved incentives, brought about by maintaining these terms in all or 
most of the supplier's contracts, remain intact.76 
Example 13. Warranty. Joe is a car manufacturer who sells directly to cus­
tomers. In his standard sales contracts, there is a two-year warranty. It is 
its boilerplate provisions a limited period of time for cancellation of the membership (on file with 
the authors). To be sure, at times suppliers may want to make the ability to cancel the contract sali­
ent in order to signal their confidence in the quality of their product or service. We are focusing here 
on different cases. 
76. See Baird, supra note 6, at 2724 ("Unsophisticated consumers are often better off in a 
market in which no one can bargain for special terms than in a market where everyone can."). 
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important to Joe to signal to his customers that the warranty cannot be 
waived. 
The reason it is important to Joe to signal to his customers that the war­
ranty cannot be waived is that if it could be waived, it would cease to signal 
the car's quality. A warranty serves two main goals. First, it provides the 
customer with insurance, according to which if the car breaks down, the 
supplier would bear the costs of fixing it. But more importantly, a warranty 
signals the car's quality, since if the supplier bears the costs of fixing de­
fects, he has an incentive to make a better and more reliable car. Many 
customers value the quality-signaling virtue of the warranty even more than 
they value the insurance aspect.77 This is because typically not all of the cus­
tomer's damages and inconvenience related to a defect would be covered. 
Moreover, the customer is interested in a reliable car with no defects for 
safety reasons as well, regardless of the insurance aspect. 
However, in order for the warranty to credibly signal the car's quality 
and reliability, the customer has to know that the warranty applies to all or 
most customers. If many customers are expected to waive the warranty, the 
supplier's incentives to make a better car would be eroded, and the car's 
quality would diminish. Consumers would then insist on paying less for the 
car or would prefer a competing car. Indeed, any given customer may try to 
waive the warranty in exchange for a refund, in order to obtain a free ride on 
the supplier's improved incentives, supposedly achieved via the warranty 
granted to all other customers. Many customers would try to do so, however, 
so that the supplier's improved incentives would no longer exist.78 
Accordingly, the supplier would be interested in credibly committing not 
to negotiate the warranty. One way to do so is to commit contractually not to 
negotiate. This would usually not be an effective commitment device, how­
ever, because customers would find it hard to monitor the supplier's 
relations with all its other customers. An alternative commitment device, 
which we are focusing upon here, is to use boilerplate provisions or stan­
dard-form contracts to make negotiation over the warranty particularly 
difficult and complicated. For example, the boilerplate provisions could 
provide that the warranty cannot be waived without prior approval by the 
CEO or the board, or without following a cumbersome process. 
Alternatively, actual contacts with buyers could be made by the sup­
plier's agents, and these agents could have no discretion to negotiate the 
contract. Typically, such a supplier will operate with standard-form con­
tracts, the terms of which are rigid and not negotiable. Blocking negotiation 
by the supplier's agents could be achieved either by an explicit rule forbid­
ding negotiation or by filling the boilerplate language with professional or 
legal jargon and employing agents that are not capable, or lack sufficient 
information or skills, to understand or negotiate the standard terms. 
77. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203-16 (2002). 
78. Id. at 2 1 6- 1 7. 
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Such mechanisms could serve as a credible commitment on the part of 
the supplier not to negotiate. Even if the supplier's agent tries to circumvent 
the complicated process and waive a warranty in exchange for a discount, 
the customer would hesitate to cooperate out of fear that such negotiated 
terms are void due to the circumvention of the required process. 
State laws often enable suppliers to submit their standard contracts to a 
certain agency or to the state's attorney general for approval.79 Such submis­
sion of a supplier's standard contracts enhances their rigidity and 
negotiation-proofness. This is because any subsequent change of the con­
tract's terms would require resubmission to the state agency for new 
approval in order to enjoy the legal defenses inherent in such approval. Also, 
a very convincing way for a supplier to signal to consumers that negotiating 
the contract is impossible is by making the transaction through the Internet, 
where, obviously, no live agent conducts any type of negotiation.80 
B .  Signaling to Commercial Buyers about Uniformity of Terms 
Another case in which a supplier would want to impose upon himself 
and his customers costs of negotiating terms is when the supplier wishes to 
signal to its customers that prices, or other terms, are uniform for all cus­
tomers. The following example illustrates this point: 
Example 14. Nondiscrimination Commitment. Finn X manufacturers re­
frigerators and sells them through various dealers. X is interested in 
committing toward the dealers that no dealer is receiving special benefits 
compared to other dealers. 
The reason it is important for X to commit not to discriminate between 
dealers is that if a dealer suspects that X is granting special benefits or dis­
counts to another dealer, the first dealer might hesitate to do business with X 
or might insist on doing business with x on terms less favorable to X.81 
79. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325G.29-.36 (West 2004 
& Supp. 2006). Section 325G.35, entitled "Review by the attorney general" states: "Any seller, 
creditor or lessor may submit a consumer contract to the attorney general for review as to whether 
the contract complies with the requirements of section 325G.3 I . . . .  Any consumer contract certi­
fied pursuant to subdivision 1 is deemed to comply with section 325G.3 1 . . . .  " 
80. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 468 ("[E]-consumers cannot negotiate be­
cause web pages and installation software do not allow for interaction with a live agent."). 
8 1 .  The supplier may also want to credibly commit to noncommercial consumers that he will 
not discriminate among them. End consumers who fear that they could be discriminated against 
could feel deceived or believe that the supplier is using them to subsidize other consumers. Novell, a 
large seller of infrastructure software and services software, states in its agreement for the sale of 
Secure Login that: "NO LICENSOR, DISTRIBUTOR, DEALER, RETAILER, RESELLER, 
SALES PERSON, OR EMPLOYEE IS AUTHORIZED TO MODIFY THIS AGREEMENT OR TO 
MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR PROMISE THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM, OR IN 
ADDIDON TO, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT." Novell, supra note 29. Such a term, cou­
pled with the fact that Novell operates with the standard contract from which this term was taken, 
helps Novell credibly commit not to negotiate. Other examples consist of firms selling according to 
a standard pricelist, which is distributed to all buyers along with a firm statement that prices are 
fixed. Negotiating the standard price is difficult, particularly when deals are made via the internet. 
Examples include the price list of Easy Garden, a gardening store marketing via the Internet, Easy 
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Interestingly, the economics literature finds that even suppliers with market 
power or a monopoly position might opportunistically grant benefits to one 
commercial buyer at the expense of another buyer competing with the first 
buyer, and that such opportunism causes all buyers to pay the supplier lower 
prices across the board.82 In order to prevent the price the supplier is able to 
charge from decreasing in such a manner, it would be in his interest to make 
a commitment not to make concessions to one buyer at the expense of an­
other. 
One way X can promise not to grant discriminatory benefits is to com­
mit contractually not to discriminate. However, such a commitment is 
difficult to enforce, and complicated monitoring mechanisms would have to 
be constructed.83 Such mechanisms could also be relatively easily circum­
vented by X, by offering subtle or disguised benefits. Accordingly, a 
possibly more credible way for X to commit not to discriminate is by devel­
oping uniform contracts and boilerplate provisions that are difficult for X to 
• 84 negotiate. 
C .  Signaling to Competitors about Uniformity of Terms 
Industry mavericks can credibly commit to becoming less eager to cut 
prices by making the terms of sale rigid and costly to change. Suppose firm 
X, from Example 14 above, is an industry maverick. Recall from Section 
II.A that an industry maverick would often like to commit to being less ag­
gressive in order to induce his rivals to compete less aggressively as well. 
Garden, Master Price List (Jan. I, 2005), http://www.easy-garden.com/masterpricelist.htm (listing 
prices for gardening supplies and portable poultry shelters), the price list of Entran, a manufacturer 
of sensors and electronics, Entran, Accelerometer Price List, http://www.entran.com/pl/plausa.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2005), and the detailed price list of TreePad, TreePad Price List, 
http://www.treepad.com/pricelist/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2005) (listing prices for its personal infor­
mation manager program and Word Processor) . 
82. See David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of 
Vertical Integration, Tying, and Vertical Restraints To Stop It, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25-75 (2003); 
Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
EcoN. ACTIVITY: MICROECON., 1 990, at 205; R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism 
in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 210 ( 1994); Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 23 
RAND J. EcoN. 299, 305 ( 1992). 
83. Indeed, the statutory ban on secondary-line price discrimination, included in Section I (a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 3(a) (2000), forbids a supplier from discriminating be­
tween competing dealers. This prohibition, however, is difficult to enforce, and infringements are 
difficult to observe or verify in court. A related practice is that of "most favored-consumer clauses," 
clauses according to which a supplier promises all buyers that if one receives a discount, all of the 
others will receive the same discount. Such clauses too are difficult and costly to implement, and, at 
times, could draw unwanted antitrust attention. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with 
Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 ANTI­
TRUST L.J. 5 17 ( 1996); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17  
RAND J. EcoN. 377 ( 1 986); Gilo, supra note 82, at 67-69. 
84. Indeed, McAfee and Schwartz claim that franchisors use uniform and rigid contracts 
with franchisees in order to better commit to not negotiate them. However, they discuss uniformity 
alone, rather than mechanisms that raise the costs of negotiation. McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 
82, at 2 1 3. 
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Finn X could often make more from price cutting (and therefore be 
more aggressive) if its price cuts could be kept secret (for example, by rene­
gotiating the terms of the contract only with a small group of large and 
discrete dealers), since then its rivals would react more slowly, if at all, and 
X's short-term gain from price cutting would be greater. Of course, X could 
cut prices (or offer an analogous benefit to buyers) by changing the terms of 
its standard-form contract across the board. Such a price cut, however, 
would be easier for X's rivals to detect quickly, and, accordingly, they would 
respond quickly, by price cutting themselves. Therefore, operating with rigid 
standard-form contracts and raising the transaction costs of negotiating the 
contract with buyers can serve as a credible commitment by X not to cut 
prices, since it makes the price cut more transparent to X's rivals .85 This 
could facilitate tacit collusion in X's industry if X is an industry maverick. 
V. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIDING 
BENEFITS IN THE BOILERPLATE 
Identifying the various uses of boilerplate language and artificial trans­
action costs imposed on buyers raises the question of whether these uses are 
desirable from a social point of view. If the answer is negative, a second 
question arises: should the law intervene, and if so, by what means? The 
analysis in Parts I-IV reveals that there are two specific practices that may 
raise legal concerns that have been ignored by the current literature and by 
courts. The first is the practice of artificially complicating the transaction in 
ways that benefit suppliers at the expense of buyers, and the second is the 
practice of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. In what follows, we shall focus 
on the policy implications of the latter. 
Throughout Parts I-III above, we have shown that hiding benefits in the 
boilerplate could benefit suppliers at the expense of some or all buyers in 
various ways. First, as shown in Section LB, hidden benefits could be used 
to price discriminate between readers of the boilerplate and nonreaders. 
Second, as shown in Sections Il.C and 11.D, beneficial boilerplate terms 
could be used by suppliers to harm competition. Finally, as shown in Sec­
tion III.A, suppliers could hide benefits in the boilerplate in order to create 
the illusion of a fair contract. Let us separately explore the policy implica­
tions of each of these three uses of beneficial boilerplate terms. Such an 
analysis will help us advise courts as to how they could cope with cases of 
beneficial boilerplate terms that raise policy concerns. 
85. With regard to most-favored-consumer clauses, discussed supra note 83, the literature 
has indeed implied that they could facilitate tacit collusion. See Baker, supra note 83, at 5 19-20; 
Cooper, supra note 83. As noted, however, such clauses are difficult to implement and could draw 
i;ntitrust scrutiny, while plain rigidity and difficulty of negotiation could more easily and credibly be 
implemented and does not currently draw antitrust attention. Therefore, the supplier may prefer 
using transaction costs and rigidity. 
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A .  Price Discrimination 
The practice of price discrimination through boilerplate provisions could 
raise objections from two different perspectives. The first is the social-policy 
perspective; the second is the perspective of the relationship between the 
supplier and the consumer who was adversely affected by the discrimina­
tion. We shall discuss these two perspectives separately. 
Social Welfare Perspective. If the supplier were able to charge each con­
sumer exactly what the consumer was willing to pay ("perfect price 
discrimination") such pricing would be socially efficient and superior to 
uniform pricing since all consumers who value the product more than the 
marginal costs of supplying it would receive the product.86 The kind of dis­
crimination achieved by hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions, however, 
is an imperfect kind. The supplier is unaware of each and every consumer's 
willingness to pay. The only thing he is assumed to realize here is that con­
sumers who are ready to incur the transaction costs of reading, 
understanding, and remembering benefits hidden in boilerplate provisions 
("readers") are, on average, willing to pay less (or unwilling to receive less 
value) than nonreaders. 
Accordingly, for example, if the uniform price the supplier would set ab­
sent discrimination is $90, by hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions, he is 
induced to set a posted price larger than $90 (say, $100) to nonreaders and 
to offer readers a price lower than $90 (say, $80). He can do so by offering 
readers a special discount of $20 off the posted price of $ 100. It may be, 
however, that some readers would have purchased the product even for the 
uniform price of $90, while some nonreaders, who would have purchased 
the product for $90, end up not purchasing the product for the posted price 
of $ 100. 
This imperfection of discrimination via boilerplate provisions poten­
tially causes two kinds of welfare losses. The first stems from nonreaders 
who would have purchased the product for $90, but would not purchase it 
for $100. Their valuation for the product (of between $90 and $ 100) is 
above the marginal costs of producing it (which are clearly below the uni­
form price of $90), but discrimination via boilerplate provisions causes them 
not to purchase the product. The larger the number of such consumers (non­
readers whose valuation of the product is between $90 and $ 100), the 
greater the deadweight loss caused by discrimination via boilerplate provi­
sions. 
The second welfare loss stems from the transaction costs imposed by the 
boilerplate provisions and born by readers who would have purchased the 
product even for the uniform price of $90, but are induced to read the boi­
lerplate provisions in order to receive the special discount. The fact that they 
earn the discount of $20 is a mere transfer from the supplier to them, while 
the transaction costs expended on reading, understanding, and remembering 
the boilerplate provisions are a deadweight loss. This loss could have been 
86. See TiROLE, supra note 40, at 1 36. 
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avoided absent discrimination via the discount hidden in the boilerplate lan­
guage. The larger the number of such consumers (readers who value the 
product more than $90), the larger the welfare loss. A related welfare loss 
involves accidental readers-those who read the boilerplate provisions but 
ultimately decide not to purchase despite the discount. Such "accidents" 
may occur since consumers cannot grasp the full extent of the benefit hid­
den in boilerplate provisions until they actually bear most of the transaction 
costs involved. The harder it is for a consumer to predict the extent of the 
benefit from just skimming the boilerplate provisions, the larger the prob­
ability of such an accident (and the larger the related welfare loss). All 
transaction costs' related losses are of course larger the more costly it is for 
a consumer to read, understand, and remember the benefit embedded in boi­
lerplate provisions. 
These welfare losses should be compared to the welfare gain from hid­
ing the discount in the boilerplate provisions. This gain is attributable to 
readers who would not have purchased the product for the uniform price of 
$90 and are induced to purchase it for $80 on account of the discount. The 
more readers who value the product between $80 and $90, the larger this 
welfare gain. From this welfare gain one has to subtract, however, the trans­
action costs such readers need to bear in order to utilize the discount. 
Admittedly, in a given case, it would be difficult for a court to assess and 
compare the welfare losses and gains. In order to do so, it would be helpful 
to assess whether the number of units the supplier sells expanded following 
the practice of hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions. If the number of 
units expanded, it would make a case in favor of nonintervention. On the 
other hand, if the number of units diminished following the practice, there is 
a strong case in favor of banning it. Such evidence implies that the practice 
caused more nonreaders to stop purchasing than it caused readers to start 
purchasing. On top of these considerations, one should take account of the 
loss involved in the transaction costs of reading the boilerplate provisions. 
But an ex post examination of whether the supplier supplies more or fewer 
units following the practice of discriminating via beneficial boilerplate 
terms is extremely difficult. This is because there are several other factors, 
unrelated to the practice, which could affect the number of units he supplies, 
including shifts in demand, cost, brand loyalty, and the intensity of competi­
tion. 
The distributive effects of discrimination via boilerplate provisions 
could also be of interest. Obviously, discrimination transfers value from 
nonreaders to readers and suppliers. The distributive concerns therefore 
hinge on the identity of readers versus the identity of nonreaders. In many 
cases, readers are the less fortunate consumers-those with lower means, 
unsteady jobs, and more time on their hands. In such cases, egalitarian con­
cerns work in favor of permitting discrimination via boilerplate provisions. 
In other cases, readers could consist predominantly of repeat purchasers or 
sophisticated customers. Here it is less obvious whether it would be advis-
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able for such customers to be enriched at the expense of nonreaders, who 
are one-time or less sophisticated customers.87 
What are the welfare effects of the "drawing mode" of price discrimina­
tion via boilerplate provisions? Recall that with this type of price 
discrimination, the supplier "draws" the benefits in favor of some consum­
ers, particularly those who are on the verge of not purchasing the product. 
This type of discrimination arguably causes even fewer welfare losses than 
the previous type, since the supplier "cherry picks" consumers with low 
willingness to pay according to their behavior. Many nonreaders who would 
not have purchased the product would be induced to purchase it in the draw­
ing mode. Furthermore, transaction costs incurred in reading the boilerplate 
provisions are expected to be smaller, as the supplier assists some consum­
ers by making the benefits hidden in the boilerplate provisions salient. 
Accordingly, there is an even stronger case for nonintervention in the draw­
ing mode of price discrimination than there is in the nondrawing mode 
discussed above. 
The above welfare analysis implies that it would be extremely difficult 
to identify cases in which discrimination via boilerplate language is welfare­
reducing. Accordingly, we believe that intervention should particularly 
hinge not merely on the discriminatory nature of beneficial boilerplate terms 
but rather on their other two uses: harming competition and creating the 
appearance of a fair contract. Still, total welfare effects notwithstanding, one 
should consider how and when current doctrines concerning the supplier­
consumer relationship could be applied to discrimination via boilerplate. 
Supplier-Consumer Perspective. One possible claim a nonreader could 
invoke against the supplier is that the supplier failed to disclose to him that 
other consumers got a better deal than the one he got. In particular, the non­
reader could claim that this undisclosed fact is a material part of the bargain, 
and since the supplier failed to disclose it, the consumer is entitled to re­
scind the contract or even sue for damages or enforce the beneficial terms in 
his favor. More specifically, such a consumer would attempt to argue that 
the supplier should have revealed to him that there were benefits hidden in 
boilerplate provisions. 
There are numerous consumer protection statutes that impose duties of 
disclosure. However, most of these statutes oblige suppliers to disclose ex­
clusionary clauses, limitations on explicit or implicit warranties, and many 
other terms that could constitute "a (bad) surprise" to a consumer who does 
not, or cannot, read boilerplate provisions carefully enough.88 Such statutes 
87. It could be asked how discrimination via boilerplate language compares with other forms 
of imperfect price discrimination (that is. discrimination based on other proxies for a person's will­
ingness to pay, such as age, occupation, and so forth). One notable point in this respect is that since 
discrimination via boilerplate language does not directly hinge on a consumer's characteristics, and 
since in this type of discrimination most consumers who are discriminated against are actually un­
aware of it, this form of discrimination arguably causes less consumer frustration than other types. 
88. For Instance, the Truth in Lending Act is aimed at increasing disclosure of credit costs to 
borrowers. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 160 1-07(c) (2000). Similarly, the Equal Credit Op­
portunity Act mandates that an applicant for credit is entitled to disclosures explaining the reasons 
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are not relevant to our case, since we are dealing here with "good" sur­
prises-and not "bad" surprises-the consumer was unaware of. 
Other statutes, prevailing in several states, impose a duty on suppliers to 
draft consumers' contracts in plain language.89 Such statutes could be of 
relevance to us, as long as the transaction costs consumers need to incur in 
order to reveal the benefits in boilerplate provisions stem from difficulties in 
understanding the wording of the contract. The plain-language statutes are 
not relevant, however, to cases where the difficulties lie in the length of the 
boilerplate language, the short time the consumer can dedicate to reading 
and understanding it, or her efforts in remembering to take the necessary 
steps in order to receive the benefits after entering into the contract. 
The common law also imposes upon a supplier a duty of disclosure in 
appropriate cases. In certain special cases, the consumer may have reason­
able expectations-stemming from his special relationship with the supplier 
or from a promise or representation made by the supplier-that he would 
disclose any material fact of the bargain to the consumer.90 A special rela­
tionship could also be deduced from the ongoing or long-term relationship 
between the supplier and the consumer, which gives rise to a duty of disclo­
sure.91 In such special cases, regardless of the welfare analysis we conducted 
above, there could be grounds under contract law for the consumer to re­
scind the contract due to nondisclosure of the hidden benefits,92 and even, in 
why credit has been denied or revoked. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 69 1 (a)-(f) 
(2000). The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act requires preparation and distribution of booklets 
that explain the nature and costs of real estate settlements. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 
1 2  U.S.C. §§ 2601-07 (2000). Finally, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act requires, among 
other things, a statement of record describing those with interests in the land, all conditions and 
plans with respect to the land, and the types of sales and transactions contemplated. Interstate Land 
Sales Full Disclosure Act, 1 5  U.S.C. §§ 1 70 1 -20 (2000). 
89. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325G.29-.36 (West 2004 
& Supp. 2006). Several other states have adopted similar laws. See, e.g., Consumer Contract Aware­
ness Act of 1990, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1 799.200--.206 (West 1998); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-1 5 1  to 
42-158 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. ti. 6 §§ 273 1-36 ( 1 999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 487-1 to -4 ( 1 995); 
Plain Language in Contracts Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30- 14- 1 1 0 1  to - 1 1 04, - 1 1 1 1  to - 1 1 13 
(2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56: 12-1  to -86 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); N.Y. GEN. 0BLIG. LAW § 5-
702 (McKinney 2001 ); 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 201-12 (West 2004); w. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46A-6- 109 (LexisNexis 1999). 
90. See generally United States ex rel. Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 83 1 ,  834 
(8th Cir. 1991 ); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of Little Rock, Ark., 
774 F.2d 909, 9 1 3  (8th Cir. 1 985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 6 1  ( 1 98 1 ); RE­
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1 ( 1 977); JoHN D. CALAMARI & JoSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 9.20, at 337 (4th ed. 1 998); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4. 1 5. 
9 1 .  See generally Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OsGOODE 
HALL L.J. 5, 20--22 ( 1984) (describing consumers' transactions as a long-term bureaucratic contrac­
tual relationship). 
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 303(b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§§ 8 cmt. e, 28 ( 1937); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, §§ 4. 1 1 ,  4. 1 5  (discussing the effects of nondis­
closure and the remedies for misrepresentation). 
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appropriate cases, to sue for damages or enforcement of the beneficial terms 
on his behalf.93 
B .  Using Beneficial Boilerplate Terms to Hann Competition 
As demonstrated in Section 11.C, when suppliers place beneficial terms 
in boilerplate language, tacit or explicit collusion could be more sustainable 
than when such a practice is banned. Note that when the practice is banned, 
if collusion breaks down, nonreaders and readers of the boilerplate provi­
sions alike enjoy competitive terms. This means that the collusion­
facilitating characteristic of creating beneficial boilerplate terms is unambi­
guously harmful. Recall also that, in Example 10, even if only supplier 
Alpha has beneficial boilerplate provisions while Beta is the industry maver­
ick, such a practice could facilitate collusion and therefore be harmful. Even 
if Alpha is the industry maverick, the practice would facilitate collusion 
when it raises Alpha's collusive profits due to its discriminatory attributes.94 
Similar are the anticompetitive harms from beneficial boilerplate provi­
sions that encourage anticompetitive accommodation by rivals or deter 
entry, as discussed in Section 11.D, above. The fear of anticompetitive ac­
commodation and entry deterrence takes place in cases similar to those 
referred to above in the discussion of collusion: industries with only a few 
substantial players. In such industries, tacit collusion is likely and imperfect 
competition is abundant; failed attempts by suppliers to exclude their rivals, 
as well as entry of new firms, are welcome, as they could dissipate supra­
competitive pricing. 
Accordingly, while the mere discriminatory characteristics of beneficial 
boilerplate terms do not justify intervention (subject to cases involving spe­
cial relationships between the supplier and the customer),95 when beneficial 
boilerplate terms are adopted by suppliers in an oligopolistic setting, the 
case for legal intervention is strengthened due to the potential anticompeti­
tive effects. Naturally, the most appropriate legal tools to deal with such 
effects are the antitrust laws. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraints of trade, re­
quires an agreement between at least two entities for it to be violated. In 
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1 (''The party in the wrong is liable for the 
loss caused to the injured party by its reliance on the misrepresentation, promise, or undertaking in 
question .. . . .  "); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4. 15 .  
When the beneficial boilerplate term involves warranties, a suit by a nonreader may be brought 
also for breach of an implied warranty. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § §  104, 108, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2304(e), 2308 (2000) (stating that the supplier cannot disclaim implied warranties, and if the 
supplier designates a written warranty as "full;' it must meet stated requirements, including an un­
dertaking to provide a remedy without charge by repair, replacement, or refund); FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 2, at § 4.29; see also Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 2-3 1 6. l  (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-3 16A (LexisNexis 1 998) (prohibiting disclaimers of implied warranties). 
94. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing how beneficial boilerplate terms 
could raise the collusive profits of the supplier adopting them, thereby deterring him from deviating 
from collusion). 
95. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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contrast, hiding benefits in boilerplate language seems to be a strictly unilat­
eral action. A rather bold and convention-breaking approach could be to 
draw an analogy between hiding benefits in boilerplate language and exclu­
sive-distribution agreements. In an exclusive-distribution agreement, a 
supplier commits toward buyer A that he will not sell to buyer B .  Such 
agreements could violate section 1 of the Sherman Act where their potential 
harm to competition outweighs their benefits to consumers.96 An analogous 
agreement is one where the supplier makes a commitment to buyer A that 
buyer A will receive benefits that buyer B will not receive.97 Creating benefi­
cial boilerplate provisions, available only to those who read, understand, and 
remember them resembles the latter kind of agreement: by imposing pro­
hibitive transaction costs on one group of consumers (those who do not read 
boilerplate language), the supplier makes a commitment to another group of 
consumers (those who do read boilerplate language) that only they will re­
ceive the benefits. From a public policy point of view, there should be no 
difference between the way antitrust law deals with this practice and the 
way it deals with two-sided vertical agreements that achieve similar out­
comes. 
One possible way to tackle the above-mentioned doctrinal problem re­
garding Sherman Act section 1 's agreement requirement is to use section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, empowering the Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC") to intervene in cases of "unfair methods of competi­
tion . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices."98 Hiding benefits in 
boilerplate language in a way that facilitates collusion, encourages anticom­
petitive accommodation, or deters entry, could be regarded both as an 
"unfair method of competition" and as an "unfair or deceptive practice."99 
96. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 4 1 8  (D.C. Cir. 
1957). 
97. Such an agreement is the flip side of a "most-favored-consumer" agreement, according 
to which the supplier commits to buyer A that if buyer B receives a benefit, buyer A will receive the 
same benefit. Such agreements have been claimed to be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 83. 
98. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l )  (2000). 
99. The FTC, however, did not succeed in using section 5 to ban "most-favored-consumer" 
clauses or uniform-delivered pricing. In £./. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FfC, 729 F.2d 1 30, 1 30 
(2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit reversed the FTC's decision that various facilitating practices, 
including uniform-delivered pricing, most-favored-customer contracts, and advance notice of price 
increases, violated section 5 of the FTC Act. The court based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that 
there was no evidence of the absence of an independent legitimate business reason for the defen­
dant's conduct. Id. at 140. See generally Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An 
Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp., 1 983 Wis. L. REV. 887, 890 (outlining 
the economic and legal attributes of facilitating practices and explaining the circumstances in which 
they could facilitate price and output coordination). 
Furthermore, the FTC has attempted to attack price signaling as an illegal facilitating practice 
under section 5 of the FTC Act. In three complaints (all of which were eventually settled), the FTC 
alleged that certain "invitations-to-collude" constituted unfair methods of competition. In each of 
those cases, the defendants had solicited their rivals to engage in a price-fixing conspiracy by signal­
ing their intentions to price at a particular level. See YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., [ 1993-1 997 Transfer 
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 23,355 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July I ,  1993) (consent order) (deal­
ing with a supplier's request that his competitor stop offering free equipment to customers); AE 
Clevite, Inc., [ 1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 23,354 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted section 5 broadly, holding that: 
"[T]he Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair. This 
broad power . . .  is particularly well established with regard to trade prac­
tices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
even though such practices may not actually violate these laws."100 Accord­
ingly, section 5 of the FTC Act, as interpreted by the courts, is well suited to 
cover cases in which public policy warrants intervention, while Sherman Act 
section 1 ,  if strictly interpreted, falls short of applying to the case due to its 
strict requirement for a two-sided agreement. 
An alternative approach would be to allow nonreaders of boilerplate 
language to attack the supplier under the statutes or common law regarding 
the supplier's disclosure requirements. Recall that we concluded in Section 
V.A.2 above, that such an approach would usually be unwarranted if the 
plaintiff's sole claim was that he was the victim of price discrimination. In 
cases in which the practice facilitates cartels, raises prices, or deters entry, 
however, intervention through disclosure rules becomes warranted. In par­
ticular, the claim would be that beneficial boilerplate terms harm nonreaders 
not only by discriminating against them, but by facilitating noncompetition 
over the terms they receive. Absent the practice, collusion would have been 
more likely to break down, failed attempts to exclude rival suppliers and 
new entry would have driven prices down, and nonreaders and readers of 
boilerplate language alike would then have enjoyed competitive terms. 
Another doctrine based on contract law that could be used to fight bene­
ficial boilerplate provisions that harm competition is the ability to declare 
contracts with nonreaders unenforceable for public policy considerations, as 
is done with some other types of anticompetitive agreements. wi 
Hiding benefits in boilerplate language in a way that harms competition 
could also be attacked, in our opinion, as illegal price discrimination under 
the Robinson-Patman Act or similar state laws prohibiting price discrimina­
tion that may harm competition. Recall that discrimination between readers 
and nonreaders of boilerplate terms is the driving force behind the anticom­
petitive effects. The Robinson-Patman Act provides, in relevant part, that 
"[i]t shall be unlawful . . .  to discriminate in price . . .  where the effect of 
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition." 102 Indeed, a 
June 8, 1993) (consent order) (dealing with a supplier's statement to his competitor that the com­
petitor's low prices were "ruining the marketplace");  Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., [1987-1993 
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'j[ 23,246 (Nov. 5, 1 992) (consent order) (same). 
100. FfC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 3 1 6, 320-21 ( 1966). 
1 0 1 .  See RESTATEMENT (SECON<>) O F  CONTRACTS § 1 88 ( 198 1 )  ("A promise to refrain from 
competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship 
is unreasonably in restraint of trade . . . .  "). See generally GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, 15 CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 80.6, at 63-65 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003). 
1 02. 1 5  U.S.C. § 13(a) ( 1994). Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(l )  (2000), has been construed as containing an overlapping prohibition of discrimination. 
See FfC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 ( 1953); Standard Oil Co. v. FfC, 
340 U.S. 23 1 ,  239-42 ( 195 1 ). State statutes banning price discrimination or unfair competition 
could also be invoked. See, e.g. , Cow. REV. STAT. § 6-2- 102 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 lOb 
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supplier hiding benefits in boilerplate language charges different prices (or 
offers different qualities) w3 to readers and nonreaders. 104 
The supplier could claim, in its defense, that beneficial boilerplate pro­
visions do not constitute price discrimination because all consumers have 
the opportunity to enjoy them. Although it could be claimed that nonreaders 
could have also enjoyed the benefits if they only took the time and effort to 
read, understand, and remember the boilerplate provisions, in reality they 
find the transaction costs of doing so prohibitively costly. Their situation 
bears some resemblance to commercial buyers who are too small for a sup­
plier's quantity discounts to be functionally available to them. Such 
commercial buyers have been held by the Supreme Court to be victims of 
illegal price discrimination inherent in the quantity discounts. 105 This is not­
withstanding the fact that these buyers could have been eligible for the 
quantity discount had they borne certain costs, such as the costs of expand­
ing, buying quantities they did not need, or buying cooperatively. 
Finally, when it is a dominant firm that hides benefits in its boilerplate 
language and this tends to deter the entry of new firms, as illustrated in Sec­
tion 11.D.2, this dominant firm could be accused of illegal monopolization 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. This section can encompass unilateral 
actions by a dominant firm that help enshrine its dominance. 106 Since this 
section also applies to unilateral actions, IO? the above-mentioned doctrinal 
(2005) (for unfair competition); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-45 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1 3-5-3 
(2005) (for price discrimination). 
1 03. To the best of our knowledge, however, the Robinson-Patman Act's ban of price dis­
crimination has not been applied to quality discrimination. Since quality and price are equivalent 
discriminatory tools in various contexts, such an application, in the types of cases discussed in the 
text, would be warranted. 
1 04. The Robinson-Patman Act deals with several kinds of injury: injury to competition be­
tween suppliers ("primary line cases"), injury to the supplier's commercial buyers who suffered a 
competitive disadvantage due to the supplier's discrimination in favor of another commercial buyer 
("secondary line cases"), and injury to the buyers' buyers from such discrimination ("tertiary line 
cases"). See FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 
1 4 1 ,  1 72-73 (S. Chesterfield Oppenheim ed., 1962). The kind of injury discussed here is that of 
primary line cases, since the harm to competition is between the supplier practicing discrimination 
via the boilerplate provisions and his rivals .  Presumably, secondary line and tertiary line cases are 
less relevant in the current context, since commercial buyers are usually induced to read benefits 
placed in the supplier's boilerplate language. 
105. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 42 ( 1 948); Edlin, supra note 26, at 559 n. 102 
(making a similar claim in favor of banning price matching as i llegal price discrimination). Al­
though cases such as Monon Salt deal with discrimination against commercial buyers ("secondary 
line cases"), they are applicable here too, since they discuss the fundamental question of whether 
price discrimination has occurred. This question is equally relevant to primary line cases, such as the 
case before us. 
1 06. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 45 1 ,  481 ( 1992); 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 1 72, 1 74 ( 1965); United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351  U.S. 377, 391-92 ( 1956); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grum­
man Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1 147, 1 1 8 1-82 ( 1 st Cir. 1994); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000). 
1 07. The Supreme Court has held: 
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hurdle regarding the agreement requirement of Sherman Act section 1 does 
not exist. 
Naturally, intervention becomes more and more warranted the more 
concentrated is the industry (that is, the fewer significant players there are in 
the relevant market), the more significant are the suppliers who adopted the 
beneficial boilerplate terms, and the more abundant is the practice among 
suppliers. If the court finds that the relevant market is open to the entry of 
new significant firms or the expansion of currently insignificant firms, and 
that such entry or expansion is likely in the near future (even after taking 
account of the possible entry-deterring effect of beneficial boilerplate 
terms), then intervention becomes less warranted. 
To be sure, we are not advocating here a per se prohibition of beneficial 
boilerplate terms adopted by oligopolistic suppliers. Suppliers should be 
allowed to claim, in a particular case, that the practice involves welfare­
enhancing attributes that outweigh the potential anticompetitive harm. The 
court would then face the nontrivial task of balancing the probable anticom­
petitive threat and the welfare-enhancing benefits. Such balancing is 
extremely familiar to courts in antitrust cases involving conduct that is not 
illegal per se but still raises considerable anticompetitive concems. 108 
C. Creating an Illusion of a Fair Contract 
Section V.A, above, showed that the discriminatory attributes of benefi­
cial boilerplate terms, in and of themselves, do not warrant intervention, and 
Section V.B showed how beneficial boilerplate terms adopted by oligopolis­
tic suppliers could warrant intervention on account of their potential 
anticompetitive effects. At times, however, beneficial boilerplate terms raise 
policy concerns even absent an oligopolistic setting, when they are used by 
the supplier to create a false appearance of a fair contract by introducing 
beneficial terms that are not enjoyed by most consumers. Courts that review 
standard-form contracts should be aware of this. Therefore, when courts 
consider a standard-form contract, they should look not only at the appear­
ance of the contract and at its theoretical potential to be fair, but rather at its 
The Sherman Act contains a "basic distinction between concerted and independent action." 
The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens 
actual monopolization . . . .  
Section 1 of the Shennan Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by 
a "contract, combination . . .  or conspiracy" between separate entities. It does not reach con­
duct that is "wholly unilateral." 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 ( 1984) (citations omitted) 
(second omission in original); see also Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
( 1984). 
108. On top of such a balancing test based on a total welfare perspective, courts would occa­
sionally need to address contractual doctrines concerning a special relationship between the supplier 
and a particular buyer. See supra notes 90--92 and accompanying text. 
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fairness in fact, given the transaction costs imposed on consumers who may 
want to enjoy its beneficial terms. 109 
For example, if while litigating a standard-form contract, the supplier 
tries to emphasize a term that gives consumers a way out of the transaction, 
the court should consider whether most consumers are really aware of that 
term and are capable of using it easily enough. The existence of the term in 
and of itself should not be a reason to conclude that the contract is fair as 
long as the court is not convinced that most consumers can really use it to 
their benefit. 
In the context of Example 1 1 ,  a court should consider whether the dry 
cleaning firm took the necessary steps to make the advantages and disadvan­
tages of insuring clothes against loss or damage clear to all consumers. It 
should also consider whether insurance was made easily available to those 
who were willing to pay for it. It is quite possible, though, that given the 
small scale of the transaction, most consumers would find the transaction 
costs involved prohibitively high, even if the cleaning firm took all neces­
sary steps to lower these costs. If this were the case, the reviewing court 
could assume that insurance was not a feasible option and consider the con­
tract's fairness under that assumption. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike previous literature, this Article did not focus on the asymmetric 
information between the supplier and consumers created by boilerplate lan­
guage that includes harsh terms. We focused on other benefits the supplier 
can derive from the transaction costs that boilerplate language and standard­
form contracts create, most of which have been ignored by courts and legal 
writers. The main goal of this Article was to identify these hidden roles of 
boilerplate language and the artificial imposition of transaction costs and to 
focus attention on them. 
As the Article has demonstrated, transaction costs generated through 
boilerplate language or in other artificial means could have different impacts 
on different types of consumers, enabling, inter alia, the screening out of 
unwanted consumers, price discrimination, cartel stabilization, and the 
studying of consumer preferences. On other occasions, the transaction costs 
are imposed in order to hide benefits granted to certain consumers. On yet 
other occasions the transaction costs are self-imposed by the supplier in or­
der to signal to buyers or competitors that negotiation of the contract would 
be very costly. 
There are also cases in which boilerplate language and the artificial im­
position of transaction costs do create asymmetry of information between 
the supplier and its consumers, as in the classic discussions of boilerplate 
language, but the asymmetry is used as a cartel-facilitating tool, an anticom­
petitive signaling device, or a tool for creating the appearance of a fair 
contract, rather than to merely extract surplus from uninformed consumers. 
1 09. See supra note 72. 
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Some of the uses of boilerplate language and transaction costs that we 
identify are desirable (such as signaling not to negotiate a warranty) and 
some are not (such as facilitating ethnic discrimination, artificially compli­
cating the contract in order to harm competition, and creating a false 
appearance of a fair contract). Most of the uses, however, are in between 
these two polarities, and their desirability depends on the particular circum­
stances of the case (such as some cases of screening out small buyers, some 
cases of price discrimination, and some cases of collecting information 
about consumer preferences). 
We identified two practices that especially raise policy concerns. The 
first is the practice of artificially complicating the transaction, and the sec­
ond is the practice of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. These concerns are 
new to the legal scholarship and case law and should be addressed by courts 
in appropriate cases. Part V of the Article approached the question of 
whether and when the use of beneficial boilerplate terms is desirable from a 
social perspective, and if not, we ask how the law should discourage them. 
W hen beneficial boilerplate terms are adopted in oligopolistic markets, legal 
intervention could be required in order to cope with the anticompetitive ef­
fects of such a practice in such a setting, subject to a balancing examination 
between the degree of potential harm to competition and possible welfare­
enhancing benefits of the practice in a particular case. We show how current 
antitrust and contract law doctrines could be applied in order to cope with 
these policy concerns. Regardless of the structure of the market, courts 
should also intervene when there is a special relationship between the sup­
plier and the harined customer raising a valid claim under contract law. 
Also, when a supplier tries to create the illusion of a fair contract by using a 
beneficial boilerplate term that is not really enjoyed by most consumers, 
courts should acknowledge the inaccessibility of the hidden benefit rather 
than judging the contract as if all consumers could enjoy the benefits. 
It is hard to verify whether suppliers are really trying to achieve most or 
all of the different goals discussed in this Article. It is also hard to know 
whether suppliers are even aware of the different uses of boilerplate lan­
guage and of artificial transaction costs imposed upon consumers. But even 
if suppliers are completely ignorant of these goals and uses, it is still impor­
tant to be aware of the consequences, even if unintended, of using 
boilerplate language. The aim of this Article was to illuminate these conse­
quences. 
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